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LIMITING MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE LIABILITY 
UNDER CERCLA: TOWARDS THE TOXIC CLEANUP 
EQUITY AND ACCELERATION ACT OF 1993 
James J. Reardon, Jr.* 
The public's only contribution to the problem was to trust too blindly 
that the chemical companies were taking care of their own messes. 
The public is already bearing more than its fair share of the cost of 
recklessness in the form of threats to the public's environment. 
Senator Al Gore l 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A loophole in a federal environmental statute has created a new 
lottery. The unlucky winners must subsidize multi-million dollar 
cleanups of hazardous waste sites. Do you qualify? Have you ever 
taken out your trash for curbside pickup?2 Did your city send the 
collected waste to a landfill where it may have been mixed with toxic 
waste? Congratulations, you may have won a share in a multi-million 
dollar cleanup. Each week most of us, in some way or another, 
discard our household garbage. Courts have held that this disposal 
of household waste may make municipalities liable to industrial pol-
luters for a substantial portion of the costs of cleaning up their 
careless hazardous waste disposal. 3 
Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) in 1980 to confront the 
• Business Editor, 1992-1993, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1 H.R. Rep. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. 62 (1980), Additional Views for "Superfund 
Report," reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6139, 6140 (statement of Sen. Gore). [hereinafter, 
Superfund Report] 
2 See generally, Jeffrey N. Martin, Supeifund Liability Jor Municipal Waste, 1991 A.B.A. 
SEC. NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T., 6. 
a United States v. Kramer, 757 F. Supp. 397 (D.N.J. 1991); B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 
754 F. Supp. 960, 967-74 (D. Conn. 1991), aJJ'd, 958 F.2d 1192 (2d Cir. 1992); Transportation 
Leasing Co. v. California, 32 E.R.C. 1499, 1501 (C.D. Cal. 1990). 
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United States' hazardous waste problem.4 Commentators have char-
acterized CERCLA as a response to the 1978 Love Canal disaster 
in Niagara Falls, New York.5 Love Canal proved that landowner 
abuses may harm neighboring property and the environment and 
thereby provided an impetus for government intervention on private 
property. 6 CERCLA forces polluters to pay for the costs the com-
pany passed on to the public by recklessly disposing of hazardous 
waste. Congress intended that when a hazardous waste site falls 
under CERCLA's regime, the private parties responsible for im-
proper disposal should pay the costs of cleaning up such a site. 7 
The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) pri-
marily targets private entities, such as industrial polluters, rather 
than public entities, such as municipalities, to recover the costs of 
hazardous waste remediation at "Superfund" hazardous waste sites. 8 
The EPA generally does not name local governments and entities 
that have contributed only municipal solid waste (MSW) to Super-
fund sites as potentially responsible parties9 (PRPs), thereby, at 
least temporarily, allowing local governments to avoid liability. 10 
Although the EPA generally does not name municipalities as PRPs 
at hazardous waste sites where municipalities have contributed 
MSW,11 industrial polluters that the EPA has sued may still attempt 
4 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, Pub. 
L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988». 
6 Gerald B. Silverman, Love Canal: A Retrospective, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 835, 835 (Sept. 
15, 1989). 
6 One might wonder why there was little pre-CERCLA federal or state regulation of land 
disposal of hazardous waste. The answer, one commentator has noted, may lie in our traditional 
respect of private property. [d. Air and water, both regulated before land waste disposal, 
"had a deep legacy of being public trusts. Land, on the other hand, was private property and 
government had no business involving itself in what people did on their land." [d. 
7 See United States v. Kramer, 757 F. Supp. 397 (D.N.J. 1991); J.S. Lincoln v. Republic 
Ecology Corp., 765 F. Supp 633,635 (C.D. Cal. 1991). 
8 See United States EPA Interim Municipal Settlement Policy, 54 Fed. Reg. 51,071 (1989) 
[hereinafter Interim Policy]; see also U.S. v. Kramer, 757 F. Supp. at 432 (noting EPA's 
enforcement discretion). 
9 "Potentially responsible party" refers to those persons who may be liable under § 107 of 
CERCLA. Section 107 delineates four classes of persons who may be liable for the costs of 
CERCLA cleanup: owners and operators of a vessel or facility; any person who at the time 
of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous 
substances were disposed of; any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged 
for disposal, transport, or treatment of hazardous substances; and any person who accepts or 
accepted any hazardous substances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration 
vessels or sites selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a threatened release 
which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous substance. 42 U.S.C. §9607(a) 
(1988). 
10 See 54 Fed. Reg. 51,071 (1989). 
11 [d. 
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to recover some of their cleanup costs from municipalities by bring-
ing contribution suits against municipalities. 12 As the EPA becomes 
more aggressive in cleaning up hazardous waste sites and recovering 
the costs of such cleanups,13 private parties are also becoming more 
aggressive in seeking PRPs to help pay the costs of cleanups. In-
creasingly, named PRPs sue municipalities in an attempt to recoup 
the costs of their growing14 CERCLA liability bills. 15 
Industrial polluters suing municipalities in third-party actions for 
contribution16 under CERCLA for the disposal of MSW is fast be-
coming a reality across the country.17 At present, there are approx-
12 Pursuant to § 113, named PRPs or any person may seek contribution for cleanup costs 
from any other person who is liable or potentially liable under Section 9607(a), during or 
following any civil action under Section 9606 or under Section 9607(a). 42 U.S.C. § 9613 (1988); 
see infra notes 75-90 and accompanying text. 
13 Enforcement Actions at EPA Continue to Climb in Civil, Criminal Cases, Penalty 
Assessments, 22 Env't. Rep. (BNA) 1832 (Nov. 29, 1991) [hereinafter Enforcement Actions]. 
Former EPA Administrator William K. Reilly set out to double the number of sites cleaned 
either by private parties on their own initiative or by the EPA by the end of 1992 and triple 
the number of cleanups by 1993. List of Sites to Be Deleted from NPL Will Be Developed by 
EPA, Official Says, 22 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1944 (Dec. 6, 1991) [hereinafter Sites to Be Deleted 
from NPL]. 
14 According to the EPA, 146 lawsuits were filed under CERCLA in fiscal 1991. See En-
forcement Actions supra note 13, at 1832. Superfund defendants were required to undertake 
hazardous waste cleanups valued at $843 million and pay the EPA $308 million for the agency's 
past cleanup costs. [d. 
15 Industrial polluters are also impleading small businesses who have contributed to the 
MSW waste stream in their attempts to expand the scope of liable parties under CERCLA. 
See, e.g., New York v. Ludlow's Sanitary Landfill Inc., No. 86-CV-853, (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 
1990); see also William K. Burke, Wasting the Superfund with Household Trash, 15 IN THESE 
TIMES 3 (June 12--25, 1991). This Comment focuses on the liability of municipalities as 
generators and transporters of MSW; private entities that face contribution actions for dis-
posing of MSW are in a situation analogous to the municipalities' dilemma. This Comment 
does not address the issue of municipal ownership of co-disposal landfills. 
16 See, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0; see also, infra notes 75-90 and accompanying text. 
17 The potential municipal liability for MSW and household waste is at issue in a growing 
number of cases before federal district and appellate courts. See U.S. v. Kramer, 757 F. Supp. 
397, 406, 409-28 (D.N.J. 1991) (13 corporate defendants filed third party complaint, naming 
more than 250 defendants including 17 local governments); B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 754 
F. Supp. 960, 967-74 (D. Conn. 1991), afl'd, 958 F.2d 1192 (2nd Cir. 1992); Transportation 
Leasing Co. v. California, 32 E.R.C. 1499 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (refusing to exclude MSW from 
CERCLA's definition of "hazardous substance" and allowing a suit by oil and chemical com-
panies seeking to make 29 California cities pay for 90 percent of an estimated $650 million 
cleanup), No. CV 89-7368-WMB(GHKx) (Jul. 21, 1992) (ruling municipalities may be liable as 
"arrangers for disposal"); Anderson v. City of Minnetonka, No. CV 3-90-312 (D. Minn.) (City 
of Deephaven's memorandum in support of summary judgment filed Apr. 24, 1991); United 
States v. Charles George Trucking Co., No. 85-2463-WD, (D. Mass. Aug. 14, 1991) (Judge 
Woodlock ruled from the bench that RCRA's Household waste exemption does not exempt 
municipalities from CERCLA liability); New Jersey Dep't of Env't Protection v. Almo Anti-
Pollution Servo Corp., No. 89-4380 (JFG) (D.N.J. third party complaint filed Nov. 20, 1990); 
New York V. Ludlow's Sanitary Landfill, No. 86-CV-853, (N.D.N.Y. fourth-party complaint 
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imately 230 municipal landfills on the National Priorities List. 18 By 
involving municipalities and their citizens in CERCLA actions for 
the disposal of municipal solid waste, industrial polluters distort 
CERCLA's purpose and threaten the integrity of one of our nations 
most powerful environmental statutes. 19 
Potential liability for municipalities is high.20 Although the total 
cleanup bill for a contaminated site averages between 25 and 30 
million dollars, one site is estimated to cost over half a billion dol-
lars.21 By shifting this massive private party liability to municipali-
ties and thereby the local taxpayer, industrial polluters may force 
municipalities to make decisions about spending priorities and 
threaten the ability of cities and towns to carry out traditional gov-
ernmental functions. 22 Moreover, municipalities that industrial pol-
luters sue for contribution have limited options.23 Municipalities may 
either settle early and at a premium with industrial CERCLA de-
fendants in contribution actions, or enter into protracted and expen-
sive litigation.24 The possibility that industrial polluters could bring 
third-party suits against municipalities under CERCLA for the dis-
posal of MSW, according to some members of. Congress, is one of 
accident rather than intention. 25 
filed Oct. 10, 1990) (two third-party defendants seek contribution for cleanup costs under 
CERCLA from 603 PRPs, including 44 municipalities); United States v. Superior 'lUbe Co., 
No 89-7421 (E.D. Pa. third party complaint filed Dec. 22, 1989); New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. 
Protection v. Gloucester Envtl. Management Serv., No. 84-0152(SSB) (D. N.J. amended third 
party complaint filed Apr. 14, 1988). 
18 56 Fed. Reg. 5598 (Feb. 11, 1991). 
19 See, Burke, supra note 15 at 3; Municipalities, Insurance Groups Seek Legislative Limits 
on Liability, 22 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1765 (Nov. 15, 1991). [hereinafter Legislative Limits] 
20 For example, Alhambra, California, which has a $55 million annual budget, could be liable 
for $20 million over a decade. Keith Schneider, Industries and Towns Clash About Who Pays 
to Get Rid of Poisons, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 1991 at A14. 
21Id. 
22 See How Should Federal Hazardous Waste Policy Address Potentially Responsible Local 
Governments?, 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 373 (July 15, 1988) [hereinafter Federal Hazardous 
Waste Policy]. Some state laws, such as California's Proposition 13 or Massachusetts' Prop-
osition 2 112 restrict the taxing flexibility of local communities. See id. Forcing liability on 
local communities for the disposal of MSW, CERCLA liability has the potential to alter the 
delivery of municipal services. See genemlly id. at 376. 
23 See Conference on Municipal Liability Planned; EPA to Develop Cost Allocation Guide-
lines, 22 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1368 (Sept. 27, 1991). 
24 See genemlly, William N. Hedeman et al. Superfund Transaction Costs: A Critical 
Perspective on the Superfund Liability Scheme, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,413, 
10,415 (1991). 
25 See, Legidative Limits, supm note 19, at 1765. Representative Robert Torricelli (D-NJ) 
at the House Public Works and Transportation Subcommittee on Investigation and Oversight 
on November 13th stated that municipalities are being governed by a 
law of unintended consequences ... In amending the Superfund law in 1986, Congress 
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The legal conflict over whether municipalities may be liable for 
MSW under CERCLA turns on how the courts have determined 
that MSW may be a CERCLA "hazardous substance."26 Even if 
municipalities may be liable under CERCLA for the cleanup of 
MSW, questions remain as to how much municipalities should pay 
towards the cleanup of a hazardous waste site and how the EPA 
should proceed with such cases. The issue of liability for MSW has 
spilled out of the courtroom and into the EPA and Congress. This 
Comment seeks to examine the judicial, administrative, and legis-
lative approaches to the problem of municipal liability for MSW. 
Section II of this Comment provides an overview of CERCLA out-
lining the statute's framework and describing CERCLA's liability 
and settlement provisions. Section III explains whatMSW is and 
considers how much of MSW is actually hazardous. Further, Section 
III introduces the legal sources courts have considered in determin-
ing whether MSW is a CERCLA hazardous substance. Focusing on 
the arguments presented in B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, Section 
IV examines how the courts have analyzed and applied CERCLA 
and EPA policy to determine that MSW may be a hazardous sub-
stance for the purpose of CERCLA liability.27 Section V of this 
Comment surveys administrative approaches that the EPA has 
taken, or at one time considered taking, concerning municipalliabil-
ity for MSW. Section VI then looks at one legislative proposal in-
tended to address the inadequacies of the judicial and administrative 
approaches to CERCLA liability for MSW. In Section VII, this 
Comment concludes that judicial remedies under CERCLA and the 
EPA's administrative proposals do not go far enough to fairly ap-
portion liability, to facilitate the settlement process with municipal-
ities, or to promote speedy cleanup. This Comment argues that the 
United States Congress should address the issue of municipalliabil-
ity for MSW under CERCLA by amending CERCLA and by passing 
the Toxic Cleanup Equity and Acceleration Act of 1993.28 
Id. 
allowed polluters to bring contribution lawsuits against other polluters . . . the 
intention was to equitably spread the cleanup costs among all persons who legiti-
mately contributed to environmental contamination at a site. But those parties that 
only contributed household garbage or sewage sludge are not legitimate contributors. 
26 B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 754 F. Supp 960 (D. Conn. 1991), a!f'd, 958 F.2d 1192 (2nd 
Cir. 1992); 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(14), 9607(a). 
27 B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 754 F. Supp 960 (D. Conn. 1991), aiI'd, 958 F.2d 1192 (2nd 
Cir.1992). 
28 139 CONGo REC. S. 1384, 1454-57 (Feb. 4, 1993) The Senate and House bills were 
introduced as S. 343 and H.R. 870 respectively. 
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II. CERCLA STATUTORY FRAMEWORK 
A. CERCLA Overview 
[Vol. 20:533 
Congress enacted CERCLA, or the "Superfund," in 1980 with the 
purpose of cleaning up the nationwide threat of toxic wastes. 29 Con-
gress' overriding purpose in enacting CERCLA was to clean up 
hazardous waste by making those responsible for careless waste 
disposal pay for their actions. 30 Some courts have indicated that 
CERCLA accomplishes this goal by making those parties who prof-
ited from hazardous waste disposal pay for the cleanup of their 
dumping. 31 
To effect CERCLA's goals, Congress required the EPA to estab-
lish an information gathering system and create a National Priorities 
List in order to prioritize the cleanup of hazardous waste. 32 CER-
CLA provided the EPA with federal authority to clean up hazardous 
waste sites through removal or remedial action. 33 Additionally, 
where there is an "imminent and substantial endangerment to the 
public health," the EPA may compel potentially responsible parties 
to undertake private response actions. 34 A federal trust, the "Su-
perfund," which is funded through federal appropriations and 
through use taxes on the chemical and petroleum industries, pro-
vides funds for the cleanup.35 Most important, Congress created a 
liability provision in CERCLA that forces those responsible for the 
improper disposal of hazardous wastes to pay their share of clean-
up costS.36 
CERCLA's provisions concerning site identification and cleanup 
are discussed next in more detail. Further, and more significant in 
relation to MSW liability, CERCLA's liability and settlement pro-
visions are also considered. 
1. Information Gathering 
CERCLA imposes strict notification requirements on past and 
present owners and/or operators of facilities where hazardous sub-
29 Rena Steinzor, Local Governments and Superfund: Who Will Pay the Tab?, 22 URB. 
LAW 79, 79 (1990). 
30 See United States v. Kramer, 757 F. Supp. 397, 410, 434-35 (D. N.J. 1991); J.S. Lincoln 
v. Republic Ecology Corp., 765 F. Supp 633, 635 (C.D. Cal. 1991). 
31 [d. 
32 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a). 
33 [d. § 9604; see also id. §§ 9601(23), 9601(24). (definitions of "removal" and "remedial"). 
34 [d. § 9606. 
35 26 U.S.C. § 9507 (1988). Money recovered under CERCLA's liability sections goes back 
into the Superfund. [d. 
36 42 U.S.C. § 9607. 
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stances are stored or disposed.37 Persons who accept hazardous sub-
stances for transport also must meet these notification require-
ments.38 These owners, operators, and transporters must report 
hazardous facilities to the EPA.39 Civil and criminal penalties but-
tress CERCLA's notification requirements.4o Any person who fails 
to notify the EPA of potential releases also forfeits any limitation of 
liability or defenses to liability under CERCLA.41 
The EPA evaluates information received as a result of CERCLA's 
notification requirements in light of the Hazard Ranking System 
(HRS) to compile a National Priorities List (NPL)-a list of sites 
needing the most immediate attention.42 The HRS prioritizes waste 
sites based on the relative degree of risk to human health and the 
environment that these sites pose.43 When the EPA places a site 
that meets the HRS criteria44 on the NPL,45 the site is subject to a 
possible clean-up action. 46 
2. Cleanup and Response 
Cleanup authority under Section 9604 may be of two types; re-
moval or remedial. 47 Removal actions are relatively short-term re-
sponses, limited under the statute to twelve months or two million 
dollars, while remedial actions are full-fledged clean-up efforts.48 The 
term "removal" appears to contemplate a more discrete action as 
compared to remedial actions.49 Removal actions provide for tem-
porary evacuation and housing of threatened individuals while re-
medial actions provide for permanent relocation of residents where 
relocation is more cost-effective and environmentally preferable. 50 
37 [d. § 9603. Owners and operators of facilities where hazardous substances are present, 
as well as transporters of hazardous substances, must notify the EPA of the existence of a 
facility where hazardous substances are or have been stored, treated, or disposed of "specifying 
the amount and type of any hazardous substances to be found, and any known, suspected, or 
likely releases of such substances from such facility." [d. 
38 [d. 
39 [d. 
40 [d. 
41 [d. §§ 9603, 9607(b). The limited CERCLA affirmative statutory defenses are available 
when a release was caused solely by an act of God, an act of war, or certain acts or omissions 
of third parties other than with whom a defendant has a contractual relationship. [d. § 9607(b). 
42 [d. § 9605(c). 
43 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (a); see 40 C.F.R. pt. 300 app. A. (1991). 
44 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (a); see 40 C.F.R. pt. 300 app. A. (1991). 
43 See 42 U.S.C. § 9605(g)(2) (considerations in adding facilities to NPL). 
46 [d. §§ 9604, 9605. 
47 See id. § 9604. 
48 Steinzor, supra note 29, at 92-93. 
49 42 U.S.C. § 9604. 
50 [d. §§ 9616(d), 9620(e). 
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A facility that is included on the NPL must undergo a remedial 
investigation and feasibility study (RIIFS).51 Through the RIIFS, 
the EPA evaluates the problems at a site and recommends cleanup 
options. 52 After an RIIFS is completed, the remedial plan to be taken 
at a site is established in a Record of Decision (ROD).53 After a ROD 
is established, a site proceeds to the design stage where a cleanup 
plan is laid out for a particular site and cleanup begins. 54 The EPA's 
authority at a site continues after cleanup, extending into the op-
erations and maintenance (0+ M) stage until a site is safe. 55 
B. Section 107 Liability 
1. Parties Liable Under CERCLA and Actions that Incur 
Liability 
CERCLA refers to the class of "persons"56 who may be liable 
under CERCLA as "potentially responsible parties" (PRPS).57 The 
four categories of "persons" that may be subject to CERCLA liabil-
ity for hazardous waste cleanup are owners, operators, transporters, 
and persons who arranged for disposal of hazardous waste. 58 The 
fourth category is commonly referred to as "generators. "59 Munici-
palities may fit into any of the four categories. For example, a 
municipality may have owned or operated a municipal landfill. More 
to the point, a municipality's sanitation department may have col-
lected MSW and taken the trash to a landfill owned by the munici-
pality or by a private contractor. This Comment focuses on munici-
palities in their capacity as either transporters or generators of 
MSW.60 
51 See id. § 9616(d). 
52 Steinzor, supra note 29, at 94. 
53 Id. 
54 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c); See Steinzor, supra note 29, at 94. 
55 See Steinzor, supra note 31, at 94. Cleanup actions taken must be consistent with the 
standards delineated in the National Contingency Plan (NCP). 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(b); see 
generally, Jeffrey W. Pusch, Private Party Cleanup: Consistency Under the 1990 National 
Contingency Plan, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 217, 220 (1991). 
56 Section 9601 defines a "person" as "an individual, firm, corporation, association, partner-
ship, consortium, joint venture, commercial entity, United States Government, State, munic-
ipality, commission, political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body." 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9601(21). 
57 Id. § 9607(a). 
58 See id. 
59 See Steinzor supra note 29, at 80. 
60 Administrative policy and proposed legislation generally treats municipalities and other 
generators and transporters of MSW in the same manner. This Comment uses the terms 
"municipality" and "generators and transporters of MSW" interchangeably. 
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The party seeking to assign liability to an owner, operator, trans-
porter, or arranger, the CERCLA plaintiff, must establish that there 
is a "release or threatened release"61 of a "hazardous substance"62 at 
a CERCLA "facility"63 that has caused that party to incur response 
costs.64 The amount of costs the PRP can be liable for can depend, 
in part, on the liability standard, as determined by whether the 
party bringing the CERCLA action is the EPA or a private party. 
2. Liability Standard 
The liability standard under Superfund is strict, joint and sev-
eral. 65 Strict liability ensnares PRPs without regard to fault; the 
intent or negligence of a PRP is not an issue. 66 CERCLA's strict 
liability standard; coupled with CERCLA's broad definition of haz-
ardous substance, allows the EPA to hold a PRP liable by showing 
merely that the wastes that require cleanup are of the same type as 
the wastes that a defendant contributed to a site. 67 The EPA does 
not need to trace a particular waste present at a contaminated site 
to a particular defendant because such evidence is limited by the 
passage of time since the wastes were actually disposed of and by 
the resulting mixture of similar wastes with different origins. 68 
61 42 u.s.c. § 9601(22). "Release" is any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, 
emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the environ-
ment (including the abandonment or discarding of barrels, containers, and other closed recep-
tacles containing any hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant) [d. 
62 See id. § 9601(14); see infra notes 131-155 and accompanying text. 
63 [d. § 9601(22)(A)(B). CERCLA defines "facility" broadly. See id. For example, buildings, 
equipment, pipes, wells, landfills, storage containers, motor vehicles, rolling stock, or air 
craft, are among the many expressly listed facilities. See id. The catch-all definition of facility 
in § 9601(22)(B) includes " ... any area where a hazardous substance has ... come to be 
located; but does not include any consumer product in consumer use or any vessel." [d. 
(emphasis added). 
64 [d. § 9607(a); see Envtl. Transp. Syst. Inc., v. Ensco, Inc., 969 F.2d 503, 506 (7th Cir. 
1992); United States v. Aceto Agric. Chern. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1378-79 (8th Cir. 1989). 
65 CERCLA, as passed in 1980, did not prescribe expressly the standard of liability for the 
statute but did provide that the standard of liability should be determined by the common 
law developed under other environmental statutes. A series of cases on the issue of CERCLA's 
standard of liability settled on strict liability. See Tanglewood East Homeowners v. Charles-
Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568, 1572 (5th Cir. 1988); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 
1032, 1044 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Hooker Chern. & Plastics Corp., 680 F. Supp. 546, 
549 (W.D.N.Y. 1988); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chern. Inc., 579 F. 
Supp. 823, 827 (W.D. Mo. 1984) aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 810 F.2d 
726 (8th Cir. 1986), cm. denied., 484 U.S. 848 (1987). 
66 See Steinzor, supra note 29, at 80. 
67 See, e.g., United States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp. 1298, 1309-10 (E.D. Mo. 1987); United 
States v. Conservation Chern. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162 (W.D. Mo. 1985); United States v. Wade, 
577 F. Supp. 1326, 1332-S3 (E.D. Pa. 1983). 
68 See Bliss, 667 F. Supp. at 1298, 1309-10; Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. at 162; 
Wade, 577 F. Supp. at 1326, 1332-S3. 
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Under joint and several liability, the EPA may sue a "small subset" 
of the PRPs for all of the "response" costs at a given site rather 
than searching for every liable party.69 The parties the EPA sues, 
whether a single PRP or a small subset of PRPs, are liable for the 
full remediation costs at a site. 70 Named PRPs, however, do have a 
remedy to recover some of the costs from un-named PRPS.71 PRPs 
that the EPA has sued may, under a right of contribution, implead 
parties that the EPA has not sued. 72 The result of joint and several 
liability under CERCLA is that PRPs the EPA has named implead 
the un-named PRPs as third or even fourth party defendants. 73 At 
Superfund sites where MSW and industrial waste have been co-
disposed,74 industrial PRPs are suing municipalities as third parties 
under CERCLA's contribution provisions. 
3. Contribution 
Named PRP defendants have the ability to sue un-named PRPs 
under a right of contribution in section 9613 of CERCLA. 75 Through 
a contribution suit, a named PRP may sue an un-named PRP in an 
attempt to recover the excess costs that the named PRP may have 
incurred in an adverse judgment or settlement with the EPA. 76 
When a named PRP sues an un-named PRP in contribution, the 
69 United States v. Kramer, 757 F. Supp. 397, 433--S5 (D. N.J. 1991) (noting that CERCLA's 
statutory scheme grants EPA enforcement discretion and that the Interim Municipal Settle-
ment Policy is rational as a means of preserving enforcement resources that would be expended 
both in obtaining evidence of the presence of household hazardous waste and incurring in-
creased transaction costs of litigation and settlement.) The Kramer court also noted that 
EPA's position was consistent with the purposes of imposing liability upon those who profited 
from the improper disposal of hazardous waste and promoting the efficient and rapid reim-
bursement of the Superfund. Id. 
70 United States v. Chern-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 808 (S.D. Ohio 1983). 
71 See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0; see infra notes 75-90 and accompanying text. 
72 See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0. 
73 Id. Any person may seek contribution from any other person who is liable or potentially 
liable under § 9607(a), during or following any civil action under § 9606 or under § 9607(a). 
Id. 
74 See 56 Fed. Reg. 5598 (Feb. 11, 1991). 
75 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0. Although CERCLA, as passed, did not expressly provide a right of 
contribution, courts found that such a right could be implied. See United States v. New Castle 
County, 642 F. Supp at 1258, 1269 (D. Del. 1986); United States v. Conservation Chern. Co., 
619 F. Supp. 162, 228 (W.D. Mo. 1985). Congress made clear that the right to contribution 
exists under CERCLA in passing the 1986 Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act 
(SARA). Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (codified primarily at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 
(1988»; see 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(1). 
76 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886 A(2) (1979); see generally Betsy F. Mason, 
Contribution, Contribution Protection, and Nonsettlor Liability Under CERCLA: Following 
Laskin's Lead, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 73, 89 (1991). 
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unnamed PRP merely faces several liability rather than the joint 
and several liability that named PRPs usually face. 77 When an un-
named PRP faces several liability in a contribution action, the PRP 
is merely liable for its "fair share" of the harm that the PRP caused 
at the Superfund site. 78 
CERCLA provides little guidance to courts as to how to apportion 
liability in a contribution actions. 79 Section 9613(f) states only that, 
in contributions claims, courts may consider equitable factors in 
allocating response costs among liable parties. 80 
Commentators have noted various approaches to apportioning li-
ability in contribution actions under CERCLA.81 Under a compara-
tive fault approach, courts could apportion liability by comparing the 
CUlpability of each PRP's involvement at a Superfund site.82 Factors 
courts may consider under the comparative fault approach are the 
extent to which a PRP knew that it was engaging in a potentially 
dangerous activity, the magnitude of the risk that a PRP knew or 
should have known it was creating, and the particular circumstances 
of a PRP's activity. 83 
Under a second approach, comparative causation, a court could 
consider the total amount of hazardous waste a, PRP has disposed 
of, taking into account the volume of the waste and the waste's 
characteristics such as toxicity.84 It is difficult to sort out relative 
shares of liability under a comparative causation approach, however, 
because wastes may be commingled.85 Moreover, site-specific data 
on wastes disposed is not usually available. 86 
77 See Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. at 162, 176, 229. 
78 See id. 
79 See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0. 
I'll/d. 
8! See Mason, supra note 76, at 93. See id. for a detailed treatment of contribution under 
CERCLA. 
82 See, e.g., Environmental Transp. Sys., Inc. v. Ensco, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 384, 388 (C.D. 
Ill. 1991), aff'd, 969 F.2d 503, 508-09, (7th Cir. 1992); United States v. Western Processing 
Co., 756 F. Supp. 1424, 1430-32 (W.D. Wash. 1990) (and cases cited); Lyncott Corp. V. Chern. 
Waste Management, 690 F. Supp. 1409, 1417-18 (E.D. Pa. 1988); see also RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A, cmt. h. 
83 See Uniform Comparative Fault Act § 2(a)(2), 12 U.L.A. 45 (Supp. 1990); see Mason, 
supra note 76, at 95. 
84 See Mason, supra note 76, at 97; see, e.g., United States v. Cannons Eng'g Corp., 720 F. 
Supp. 1027, 1044 (D. Mass. 1989) (basing liability among de minimis parties on their respective 
shares of wastes contributed), aff'd, 899 F.2d 79 (lst Cir. 1990); United States v. Ottati & 
Goss, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 1361 (D.N.H. 1985), modified, No. 80-225-L, 24 Env't Rep. Cas. 
(BNA) 1152 (D.N.H. Mar. 3, 1986). 
85 See United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1253 (S.D. Ill. 1984). 
86 See United States v. Chern-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 811 (S.D. Ohio 1983). 
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A third approach to apportioning liability in contribution actions 
is the "Gore Factors" approach.87 Under the six factors of the Gore 
approach, a court could consider: the PRP's ability to prove that its 
contribution was distinguishable from that of other PRPs; the 
amount of hazardous waste attributable to the PRP; the toxicity of 
that waste; the PRP's involvement in the generation, transportation, 
treatment, storage, or disposal of the waste; the degree of care that 
the PRP exercised in those activities; and the extent to which the 
PRP cooperated with government officials in preventing further 
harm. 88 
One court noted some additional factors that courts might consider 
in using their equity powers to apportion liability.89 Additional con-
siderations might include the benefits a party receives from its con-
taminating activities, the knowledge and/or acquiescence of the party 
in the contaminating activities, and a party's ability to pay for the 
cleanup. 90 
4. Settlement Tools 
Instead of litigating cost recovery actions, the EPA may, under 
CERCLA section 9622, settle with PRPs through a consent decree 
or administrative order covering the performance of response actions 
and the payment of costS. 91 When settling with a PRP, the EPA 
may also provide a PRP with a covenant not to sue, in which a PRP's 
liability for matters covered in the agreement are discharged.92 A 
PRP that settles with the EPA also receives contribution protec-
tion. 93 The settling party will not be liable for the contribution claims 
of non-settlors.94 
87 See H.R. 7020, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. § 3071 (3)(B)(i)-(vi) (1980); see also Mason, supra 
note 76, at 99. 
88 See, e.g., A & F Materials, 578 F. Supp. at 1249, 1253 (citing Gore Factors), 
89 Environmental Transp. Sys., Inc. v. Ensco, Inc., 969 F.2d 503,508,509 (7th Cir. 1992). 
The Ensco court also noted that, while not appropriate in the case at hand, the court would 
not exclude the possibility that a pro rata approach, where the costs of a harm would be 
divided equally among the number of responsible parties, might be workable in an appropriate 
case.Id. 
00 Id. 
91 See 42 U.S.C. § 9622. 
92 See id. (statutory requirements to grant a covenant not to sue). In settling with a PRP, 
the EPA may, however, include a re-opener clause to cover conditions unknown at the time 
of agreement. See Hedeman et aI., supra note 24, at 10,425. 
93 See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(2). 
94 See id. 
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CERCLA provides tools that the EPA may use to facilitate set-
tlement. 95 Three such settlement tools are de minimis settlements,96 
non-binding allocations of responsibility (NBARs),97 and mixed fund-
ing. 98 
Generally, de minimis settlements allow persons who contributed 
minimal amounts of hazardous substances to a site, both in terms of 
volume and toxicity, to resolve their liability early in the response 
process.99 By allowing a party to settle its share of liability early in 
a response action, de minimis settlements reduce transaction 
costs. 100 The EPA has not placed priority on de minimis settlements 
because of limited agency resources and the emphasis the Agency 
places on recovering response costs from major waste contributors 
at a facility.101 Municipalities generally have not been able to take 
advantage of de minimis settlements.102 
Through an NBAR, the EPA allocates the percentages of a site's 
response costs among PRPS.103 NBARs could reduce costs by ap-
portioning liability at an early stage of a response action and by 
apportioning liability administratively rather than through litiga-
tion. 104 Similar to the EPA's treatment of de minimis settlements, 
the EPA has made little use of NBARS.105 In a mixed funding 
agreement, the EPA reimburses a portion of a PRP's costs in an 
effort to encourage quick cleanup.106 Mixed funding is another set-
tlement tool that the EPA generally does not utilize. 107 
In addition to CERCLA's statutory scheme, which industrial pol-
luters claim MSW falls within, it is helpful to understand what MSW 
is. The next Section combines the general conception of what MSW 
is with some scientific data that points to MSW's low hazardous 
constituent content. 
9fi See id. §§ 9622(b)(1), 9622(e)(3), 9622(g). 
96 See id. § 9622(g). 
97 See id. § 9622(e)(3). 
98 See id. § 9622(b)(1). 
99 See Hedeman supra note 24, at 10,424; see also 57 Fed. Reg. 29,312 (1992) (final Rule, 
EPA de minimis policy). 
100 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g). 
101 See Hedeman et al., supra note 24, at 10,425. 
102 See Sites to Be Deleted/rom NPL supra note 13, at 1944; see also 138 CONGo REc. 8362 
(1992)(statement of Senator Durenberger). 
103 42 U.S.C. § 9622(e)(l); see also Hedeman supra note 24, at 10,425. 
104 See Hedeman supra note 24, at 10,425. 
105 [d. 
106 42 U.S.C. § 9622. 
107 See Hedeman supra note 24, at 10,424. 
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III. MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTES As A "HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE" 
UNDER CERCLA 
A. What is Municipal Solid Waste? 
MSW consists of municipal garbage collected and deposited in 
landfills. 108 In order of concentration, MSW is generally composed of 
paper, plastic, yard waste, food, glass, and inorganic matter. l09 Such 
waste may, however, contain constituents that are hazardous under 
CERCLA.110 These hazardous constituents may come from house-
hold items such as batteries, paint thinner, and pesticides. III In 
short, MSW is what one puts in his or her trash can every day. The 
question remains: Is MSW hazardous? 
1. How Hazardous is MSW? 
Studies have reached varying conclusions as to whether or not 
MSW should be considered hazardous. 112 Most studies generally con-
firm, however, that MSW's potentially hazardous constituents rep-
resent a very small percentage of the overall volume and weight of 
MSW present at a co-disposal site. 113 Some studies, for example, 
indicate that less than one half of one percent of MSW is hazardous. 114 
One study indicated that only .1% of MSW, by weight, is hazard-
OUS. 115 
Although the percentage of hazardous waste that MSW may con-
tain is small, studies have reached different conclusions as to 
whether there is any difference between landfills containing only 
household waste and landfills containing only industrial waste. One 
study, authored by Brown and Donnelly, concluded that the risks 
associated with leachate from municipal waste landfills are similar 
108 Steven Ferry, The Toxic Time Bomb: Municipal Liability for the Cleanup of Hazardous 
Waste, 57 G.W. L. REV. 197,202 (1988). 
109 ld. at 200. 
110 I d. at 205. 
111 ld. at 205; see 54 Fed. Reg. 51,071, 51,074 (1989)(definition of Municipal Solid Waste). 
112 See infra notes 114-28 and accompanying text. 
113 See infra notes 114-28 and accompanying text. 
114 Rena I. Steinzor & Matthew F. Lintner, Should Taxpayers Pay the Cost of Superfund?, 
22 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,089 (Feb. 1992) citing, Kinman & Nutini, Hazardous 
Waste in The Sanitary Landfill, 11 CHEM. TIMES & TRENDS 23, 24 (1988). 
115 See Ferry, supra note 108 at 210, citing Parsons & Lage, Chlorinated Organics in 
Simulated Groundwater Environments, RES. & TECH., May 1985, at 52,57-59. 
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to the risks from industrial waste landfills. 116 Subsequent analysis of 
the same data, however, reaches the opposite conclusion.117 Some 
more recent studies suggest that landfills containing only MSW are 
distinguishable from both co-disposal landfills and purely industrial 
landfills. lIB 
Several studies have criticized the Brown and Donnelly study's 
conclusion that the risks associated with leachate from municipal 
waste landfills are similar to those from industrial waste landfills. 119 
The first study states that the Brown and Donnelly analysis does 
not support the conclusion that leachates from municipal landfills 
pose a "risk" to human health comparable to the risks that industrial 
landfills pose or that such levels of risk may amount to a significant 
threat to human health. 120 The criticism compared MSW landfill 
leachate to tap water and beer121 and suggested that drinking water 
affected by MSW landfills is little different from municipal tapwater 
throughout the nation. 122 The study further suggested that "leachate 
from at least some municipal waste landfills is a dilute alcoholic 
beverage. "123 A second study also concluded that the Brown and 
Donnelly study failed to substantiate its assertion that MSW and 
hazardous waste landfills pose equivalent health risks. 124 
A third study tested and disproved the hypothesis that there is 
no difference between leachate characteristics in hazardous waste 
landfills and in MSW landfills. 125 The study concluded that leachates 
from MSW landfills and hazardous waste landfills easily may be 
116 K.W. Brown and K.C. Donnelly, An Estimation of the Risk Associated with the Organic 
Constituents of Hazardous and Municipal Waste Landfill Leachate, 5 HAZ. WASTE & HAZ. 
MAT. 1 (1988). Dr. Brown also submitted an affidavit concluding that the MSW involved in 
the Murtha case was hazardous. See B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 754 F. Supp. 960, 972 (D. 
Conn. 1991), aff'd, 958 F.2d 1192 (2d Cir. 1992). 
117 See infra notes 119-27 and accompanying text. 
118 See infra notes 119-27 and accompanying text. 
119 Clement Int'1. Corp., Review of Brown and Donnelly's (1988) Paper: An Estimation of 
the Risk Associated with the Organic Constituents of Hazardous and Municipal Waste Land-
fill Leachates, (1991) (on file with author) [hereinafter Review of Brown]; Edmund A.C. Crouch 
et aI., A Critique of" An Estimation of the Risk Associated with the Organic Constituents of 
Hazardous and Municipal Waste Landfill Leachates, K.W. Brown and K.C. Donnelly, 1988, 
Cambridge Environmental Inc. (1991) (on file with author). 
120 See Crouch, supra note 119, at 1. 
121 See id, at 9-13. 
122 [d. at 11, 12. 
123 [d. at 9. 
124 See Review of Brown supra note 119, at 17. 
125 Robert D. Gibbons, Statistical Comparison of Leachate From Hazardous, Co-Disposal 
and Municipal Solid Waste Landfills, University of Illinois at Chicago, 1, 1 (1991) (on file 
with author). 
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distinguished in terms of detection frequency and concentration of 
toxic constituents detected. 126 The study also noted that co-disposal 
facilities may be distinguished from purely hazardous waste landfills 
and from purely MSW landfills. 127 
The usefulness of these studies, however, appears limited. Studies 
that suggest that MSW is relatively innocuous in nature do not 
exculpate municipalities seeking to avoid liability in a contribution 
action because even trace amounts of hazardous substances contrib-
uted to a site will trigger liability. Conversely, such generic studies 
do not necessarily prove that all MSW is hazardous or that the MSW 
at a particular site is hazardous. Industrial polluters, however, may 
benefit from generic MSW studies if they are able to convince a court 
that all MSW is hazardous. l28 It appears possible that such studies 
might be useful to a court in apportioning liability. 
B. CERCLA, RCRA, and EPA Policy: Where Does MSW Fit In? 
In one of the main arguments to defend against third-party liabil-
ity, municipalities have contended that because MSW and household 
wastes are practically similar, and because household waste is ex-
empt from being regulated under the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act (RCRA) as a hazardous substance, MSW should not 
be considered a hazardous substance under CERCLA.129 Courts 
have not accepted this defense noting that it is not inconsistent both 
to regulate MSW as a non-hazardous substance under RCRA and 
treat MSW as a hazardous substance for the purposes of liability 
under CERCLA.130 
1. Hazardous Substances Under CERCLA 
CERCLA defines hazardous substance by incorporating through 
reference the hazardous substance definition in other federal envi-
ronmental statutes. 131 These other environmental statutes do not 
state expressly that MSW is a hazardous substance, but do, however, 
list substances that may be trace components of MSW.132 Addition-
126 [d. at 1-2, 7. 
127 [d. at 1-2, 7, 20. 
128 See infra notes 224-227 and accompanying text. 
129 B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 754 F. Supp. 960, 972 (D. Conn. 1991), aff'd, 958 F.2d 
1192 (2d Cir. 1992). 
130 [d. 
131 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (incorporating those substances regulated under CERCLA § 9602, 
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, the Solid Waste Disposal Act (RCRA), the Toxic 
Substances Control Act, and the Clean Air Act). 
132 See 40 C.F.R. § 302.4(a) (1991). 
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ally, pursuant to section 9602 of CERCLA, the EPA also may des-
ignate as hazardous other substances that existing environmental 
law statutes do not encompass if such substances may endanger 
public health, welfare, or the environment. 133 To date, EPA has 
listed over 700 substances. 134 
2. Hazardous Substances Under RCRA 
RCRA135 regulates the day-to-day handling of solid and solid haz-
ardous wastes. 136 CERCLA incorporates those substances that 
RCRA defines as hazardous. 137 Under RCRA, the EPA uses two 
methods to define and classify hazardous wastes. 138 The EPA deter-
mines that a waste is hazardous either because the waste is a 
"characteristic"139 hazardous waste or because the EPA rules have 
specifically designated or listed140 the waste as hazardous. 141 
RCRA features two distinct regulatory systems: Subtitle C142 ap-
plies to hazardous solid wastes, while the less rigorous Subtitle D143 
covers the regulation of non-hazardous solid wastes. RCRA regula-
tions broadly define "household waste" to include "any material . . . 
133 See 42 U.S.C. § 9602; see also id. § 9601(14). CERCLA section 101 defines hazardous 
substance as, 
Id. 
A) any substance designated pursuant to section 1321(b)(2)(A) of Title 33, (B) any 
element, compound, mixture, solution, or substance designated pursuant to section 
9602 of [CERCLA], (C) any hazardous waste having the characteristics identified 
under or listed pursuant to section 3001 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act [42 
U.S.C.A.§ 6921] (but not including any waste the regulation of which under the Solid 
Waste Disposal Act [42 U.S.C.A. § 6901 et seq.] has been suspended by Act of 
Congress), (D) any toxic pollutant listed under section 1317 (a) of Title 33, (E) any 
hazardous air pollutant listed under section 112 of the Clean Air Act [42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 7412], and (F) any imminently hazardous chemical substance or mixture with respect 
to which the Administrator has taken action pursuant to section 2602 of Title 15. 
Petroleum and various forms of natural gas are not hazardous substances under 
CERCLA. 
134 40 C.F.R. § 302.4. 
135 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901, et seq. 
136 See United States v. Aceto Agric. Chern. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1376-77 (8th Cir. 1989). 
137 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14)(c); 40 C.F.R. 261.30-33 (1991) (RCRA hazardous wastes). 
138 42 U.S.C. § 6921. 
139 "Characteristic" wastes are those wastes which do not meet EPA criteria pertaining to 
ignitability, corrosivity, reactivity, and toxicity. 40 C.F.R. § 261.21-.24 (1991). 
140 See id. § 261.11. 
141 See Randolph L. Hill, An Overview of RCRA: The "Mind-Numbing" Provisions of the 
Most Complicated Environmental Statute, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,254, 10,258 
(July 1991). Wastes are listed as hazardous taking into account toxicity, persistence, and 
degradability in nature, potential for accumulation in tissue, and other related factors, such 
as flammability, corrosivity, etc. 42 U.S.C. § 6921(a); see also 40 C.F.R. § 261.11. 
14242 U.S.C. §§ 6921-6939(b). 
143Id. §§ 6941-6949(a). 
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derived from households. "144 Household waste is not considered to 
be a hazardous waste under RCRA.145 Therefore, household waste 
is exempt from Subtitle C's hazardous waste regulations. 146 Rather, 
household waste is subject to the less stringent handling require-
ments of Subtitle D.147 Moreover, household hazardous wastes-
wastes that would be regulated under Subtitle C if generated by a 
non-household in greater than small quantity generator148 limits-
are also exempt from subtitle C. 
Considering CERCLA and RCRA together, MSW may contain 
CERCLA hazardous constituents that could trigger liability. At the 
same time, MSW is managed under RCRA as a non-hazardous sub-
stance. RCRA's definition of household wastes is substantially sim-
ilar to EPA's definition of MSW under EPA's Interim Municipal 
Settlement Policy concerning MSW's treatment under CERCLA. 
3. EPA's Interim Municipal Settlement Policy 
The EPA established the Interim Municipal Settlement Policy 
with dual purposes. The Interim Policy provides enforcement guid-
ance to EPA regional offices in dealing with municipalities and mu-
nicipal wastes under CERCLA while also delineating how the EPA 
will treat municipalities and private parties in the CERCLA settle-
ment process at municipal landfills. 149 Apparently, the policy also 
aims to establish national consistency in handling the complexity of 
Superfund sites involving municipalities. 150 
a. Definition of MSW 
The EPA has defined MSW unofficially in its Interim Municipal 
Settlement Policy.151 The Interim Policy refers to MSW as solid 
144 Id. EPA regulations provide that household waste that has been collected, transported, 
stored, treated, disposed, recovered (e.g., refuse-derived fuel) or re-used, is not hazardous. 
Id. 
145 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(b)(I). 
146Id. But see Solid Waste Disposal Facility Criteria, 56 Fed. Reg. 50, 978 (1991) (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 257, 258) (final rule creating new criteria, more stringent than 
Subpart D but less stringent than Subpart C, for municipal solid waste landfills). 
147 B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 754 F. Supp. 960, 965 (D. Conn.), a/I'd 958 F.2d 1192 (2d 
Cir. 1992). 
148 Less that 100 kg/month of hazardous waste and less that lkg/month for acute hazardous 
wastes. 40 C.F.R. § 261.5. 
149 54 Fed. Reg. 51,071 (1989). 
150 Id. 
151 I d. The Interim Policy does not have the force of law but is merely a guidance tool for 
the EPA. See B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 754 F. Supp. 960, 967 (D. Conn. 1991), aff'd, 958 
F.2d 1192 (2d Cir. 1992). 
1993] MSW LIABILITY 551 
wastes generated primarily by households that may include some 
wastes from commercial, institutional, and industrial sources. 152 The 
Interim Policy notes that MSW generally is composed of large vol-
umes of non-hazardous substances such as yard waste, food waste, 
glass, and aluminum and may contain small quantities of household 
hazardous wastes, such as pesticides and solvents as well as small 
quantity generator wastes. 153 The Interim Policy also recognizes that 
the level of hazardous constituents in MSW is generally minimaP54 
and that the actual composition of MSW varies considerably among 
individual Superfund sites. 155 
b. Treatment of Municipalities Under the Interim Policy 
The Interim Policy first addresses if municipalities will be notified 
as PRPs at municipal landfills. l56 The EPA will include data gained 
from municipalities in the information gathering process in deter-
mining whether the Agency will notify a municipality. The Interim 
Policy also addresses how the EPA will treat municipalities if they 
are notified. 157 
The Interim Policy states that the EPA generally will not pursue 
municipalities who are generators or transporters of MSW to help 
pay for Superfund cleanup costs when the waste is believed to be 
derived from households. 158 Nor will the EPA pursue private parties 
for contributing similar wastes to a site. 159 The EPA may, however, 
send PRP notices to municipalities or private parties when the EPA 
has information that the MSW at a site contains a hazardous sub-
stance originating from a commercial, institutional, or industrial 
process or activity.160 An exception to the general policy of not 
notifying municipalities where only household hazardous wastes are 
present exists when the total contribution of commercial, institu-
tional, and industrial wastes private parties contributed to the site 
is insignificant compared to relative toxicity and volume of the 
MSW.161 If the EPA does notify a municipality, the EPA will treat 
152 54 Fed. Reg. at 51,074. Commercial, institutional, and industrial wastes are defined as 
those wastes essentially the same as MSW. Id. 
153 Id. 
164 See Ferry, supra note 108, at 197, 210. 
165 54 Fed. Reg. at 51,074. 
166 Id. at 51,073. 
157Id. 
158 Id. at 51,075. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. 
161Id. 
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the municipality like any private party.162 The EPA may, however, 
opt to reach settlements that take into account the unique nature of 
municipalities. 163 
The tools the EPA may use in settlements with named municipal-
ities include delayed payment, delayed payment schedules, and in-
kind contribution. l64 Delayed payment simply allows a municipality 
to pay its liability in a lump sum at a later date. 165 Delayed payment 
schedules allow a municipality to pay its share of liability over 
time. 166 In-kind contributions allow a municipality to provide services 
at a site such as operations and maintenance in exchange for a 
reduction of liability.167 Although these flexible modes of settlement 
may help named PRPs, unnamed PRPs have not benefitted from the 
special settlement opportunities. 
Significantly, the Interim Policy does not preclude contribution 
actions. l68 As the Interim Policy now stands, municipalities avoid 
EPA prosecution but face private party contribution suits. 
IV. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF MUNICIPAL LIABILITY UNDER 
CERCLA FOR MSW 
Industrial polluters have exploited the opportunity to bring third 
party actions against municipalities for the contribution of MSW to 
co-disposal landfills. Municipalities have resisted third-party actions 
on the basis that the generation or transportation of MSW does not 
trigger liability under CERCLA. The district courts have held oth-
erwise. 169 In the only case to reach an appellate court, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed that munic-
ipalities may be liable under CERCLA if their MSW actually con-
tains CERCLA hazardous substances. 17o The municipal defendants 
have not appealed the appellate court's decision. Absent a change in 
EPA policy or congressional action, municipalities must abide by 
present judicial interpretations for their potential MSW liability. 
162 [d. 
163 [d. 
164 [d. 
166 [d. 
166 [d. at 51,076. 
167 [d. 
168 See id. 
169 United States v. Charles George Trucking Co., No. 85-2463-WD, (D. Mass. Aug. 14, 
1991); United States v. Kramer, 757 F. Supp. 397 (D.N.J. 1991); B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 
754 F. Supp. 960, 967-74 (D. Conn. 1991), aff'd, 958 F.2d 1192 (2d Cir. 1992); Transportation 
Leasing Co. v. California, 32 E.R.C. 1499, 1501 (C.D. Cal. 1990). 
170 Murtha, 958 F.2d at 1192. 
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A. B.F. Goodrich v. Murtha 
B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha l71 is one of the prominent cases 
litigated concerning the validity of municipal liability for MSW under 
CERCLA. Murtha was the first case that reached a United States 
Court of Appeals on the hotly contested MSW liability issue. 172 In 
Murtha, two Connecticut landfills involved in a CERCLA cleanup, 
the Beacon Heights Landfill and the Laurel Park Landfill, contained 
hazardous waste.173 The EPA named B.F. Goodrich Company (B.F. 
Goodrich) and Uniroyal Chemical Company (Uniroyal) as PRPs but 
followed the Interim Policy by not naming municipalities as PRPs. 
B.F. Goodrich filed a claim for contribution against Murtha, the 
owner and operator of the two landfills, for response costS. 174 In 
turn, Murtha filed a third-party complaint against approximately 200 
parties, including twenty-one municipalities, alleging that the mu-
nicipalities disposed of MSW at the site. 175 B.F. Goodrich and Uni-
royal also amended their complaints to include the municipalities 
that the EPA had not named as PRPS.176 
The municipalities argued that, in collecting or generating pri-
marily household MSW, municipalities did not arrange for the dis-
posal, treatment, or transportation of hazardous substances, and 
that the court should hold that municipalities are exempt from con-
tribution actions seeking cleanup costs for MSW under CERCLA.177 
The private party PRPs asserted that both the Beacon Heights and 
Laurel Park Landfills contained MSW and that the MSW contained 
hazardous materials. 178 Because the municipalities were responsible 
for MSW disposal, the industrial PRPs argued, municipalities were 
likewise liable for a portion of the cleanup costS.179 The EPA also 
filed a brief arguing against municipal immunity from CERCLA 
liability. 180 
171 Murtha, 754 F. Supp. at 960, 972. 
172 See id. 
173 [d. at 961-62. 
174 See id at 96l. 
175 [d. at 962. 
176 Third Amended Complaint of Uniroyal Chemical Co. alleging additional claims against 
certain municipalities and housing authorities, B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 754 F. Supp. 960 
(No. N-87-52 (PCD». 
177 B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 754 F. Supp. 960, 967 (D. Conn. 1991), afl'd, 958 F.2d 
1192 (2d Cir. 1992). 
178 See id. at 962. 
179 [d. 
180 Opposition of the United States to the Motion for Summary Judgment Filed on Behalf 
of the Municipal Defendants, B.F. Goodrich v. Murtha, 754 F. Supp. 960 (No. N-87-52(PCD». 
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1. The Municipal Argument 
The municipalities argued that through section 9604, CERCLA's 
incorporation of RCRA also incorporates RCRA's exemption for 
household waste and that MSW therefore is not a hazardous sub-
stance under CERCLA.181 By not finding MSW exempt from CER-
CLA, the court would render the RCRA exemption meaningless. 182 
The municipalities asserted that if the court found the municipal-
ities liable for merely generating MSW, it would be making every 
household member in the municipalities liable for putting their trash 
out for pickup. 183 Municipalities would shift the costs of cleanup back 
to their citizens in the form of higher taxes even though Congress 
was concerned with making polluters rather than taxpayers pay. To 
support this assertion, the municipalities pointed to the Superfund 
structure that taxes the chemical industry, CERCLA's silence on 
MSW, and the lack of discussion concerning MSW in CERCLA's 
legislative history. 184 
The municipal defendants also contended that the court should 
defer to the Interim Municipal Settlement Policy as law because the 
Policy is EPA's only official interpretation of CERCLA in relation 
to the MSW issue, and because the policy is the result of extensive 
consideration and public comment. l85 The municipalities asserted 
that because Congress intended the EPA to have substantial discre-
tion in administering CERCLA, the court must defer to the EPA's 
interpretation of municipal liability under CERCLA if that interpre-
tation is reasonable and consistent with congressional intent. 186 Fur-
ther, the municipal defendants noted that although the Interim Pol-
icy acknowledges that MSW may contain a small amount of 
181 Murtha, 754 F. Supp. at 964; 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(b). 
182 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14); see also 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(b). 
183 Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment Filed on Behalf 
of the Defendant Municipal/Government Agency Collectors Group at 30-31, Murtha, 754 F. 
Supp. 960 (No. N-87-52 (PC D». 
184 [d. at 31. 
180 See [d. at 32. 
186 See id; see also Ayuda, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 880 F.2d 1325, 1344 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (defer-
ence to agencies is appropriate not only because of agency expertise but also because Congress 
is presumed to delegate the policy choices inherent in resolving statutory ambiguities to the 
agency charged with implementation of the statute; Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842--43 (1984) (when intent of Congress is clear, Court 
and agency must defer; Court will defer to permissible agency interpretation when Congress' 
intent unclear); American Mining Congress v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1177, 1182, (D.C. Cir. 1987), (if 
Congress has not addressed the question, the court must look to the agency's interpretation 
to construe the statute); Chern. Waste Management Inc., v. EPA, 869 F.2d 1526, 1540, (D.C. 
Cir. 1989), (EPA has broad discretion to interpret its own rules). 
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household hazardous wastes, the Interim Policy presumes that MSW 
is non-hazardous unless site-specific information is provided to the 
EPA that MSW contains a hazardous substance from a commercial, 
institutional, or industrial process or activity. 187 
2. The Industrial Argument 
The industrial PRP argument followed simply from the language 
of CERCLA.188 Municipalities are persons who may be liable under 
CERCLA.189 MSW may contain hazardous substances that trigger 
liability under CERCLA.190 Therefore, municipalities are subject to 
contribution actions that PRPs may bring. 191 
The industrial plaintiffs claimed that Congress did not intend that 
municipalities be treated differently from any other party under 
CERCLA.192 The plaintiffs also claimed that the Interim Policy does 
not immunize municipalities but is, instead, merely an expression of 
EPA's prosecutorial discretion. 193 The plaintiffs pointed to the In-
terim Policy's disclaimer that states that the Interim Policy is de-
signed to guide EPA personnel and does not create any substantive 
rights. 194 Finally, the plaintiffs argued that the court should not defer 
to the Interim Policy. Rather, the industrial plaintiffs claimed that 
the Interim Policy is merely guidance for the EPA and that the real 
issue was whether municipalities were liable under CERCLA's ex-
press terms. 195 
The EPA intervened in Murtha to argue that the Interim Policy 
did not apply because the Interim Policy did not create immunity 
from contribution. 196 The EPA argued that the United States gov-
ernment has an interest in the case because the EPA may desire to 
187 Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment Filed on Behalf 
of the Defendant MunicipallGovernment Agency Collectors Group at 37, Murtha, 754 F. Supp. 
960 (No. N-87-52 (PCD». 
188 Beacon Heights Coalition Plaintiffs' and Uniroyal Chemical Co.'s Memorandum of Law 
in Opposition to the Defendants MunicipaVGovernment Agency Collectors Group's Motion for 
Summary Judgment at 5-6., Murtha, 754 F. Supp. at 960 (No. N-87-52 (pCD». 
189 [d. 
190 [d. 
191 [d. 
192 [d. 
193 [d. at 14-18. 
194 [d. 
195 [d. 
196 Opposition of the United States to the Motion for Summary Judgment filed on behalf of 
the Municipal Defendant, B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 754 F. Supp. 960 (D. Conn. 1991) 
(No. N-87-52 (PCD», a/i'd, 958 F.2d 1192 (2d Cir. 1992). 
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recover from municipalities the response costs that corporate PRPs 
do not meet. 197 Similar to the plaintiff's argument, the EPA pointed 
to the broad liability imposing language of CERCLA as indicating 
that municipalities are not exempt. 198 
3. The Decision: Municipalities May be Liable 
Judge Peter Dorsey denied the municipalities' motion for summary 
judgment holding that municipalities may be liable under CERCLA 
for the disposal of MSW.l99 The Murtha court rejected the munici-
palities' contention that CERCLA's definition of hazardous sub-
stance incorporates RCRA's regulatory exemption for household 
waste.2OO Instead, the exemption is limited to RCRA. Based on 
CERCLA's strict liability provision, the court noted that even 
though MSW may contain only small quantities of CERCLA hazard-
ous substances, the municipalities may still incur liability.201 While 
the amount of hazardous substances may be considered in the ap-
portionment stage, the fact that MSW contains a small percentage 
of CERCLA hazardous substances did not· provide immunity for 
municipalities.202 Moreover, CERCLA's silence on MSW did not cre-
ate an exemption for MSW because Congress could have provided 
expressly for an exemption for MSW as Congress did with natural 
gas and petroleum. 203 
The district court did not find the argument that MSW liability 
under CERCLA shifts liability to the local taxpayer to be persua-
sive.204 Instead, the Murtha court was more concerned about the 
possibility that liability might be shifted to the national tax base 
through the Superfund if the court prohibited cost recovery from 
municipalities that disposed of MSW containing hazardous sub-
stances.205 The court viewed such a result as inconsistent with Con-
gress' intent that entities responsible for a hazardous release bear 
the cost of cleanup. 206 
197 [d. 
198 [d. 
199 Murtha, 754 F. Supp. at 960, 967-74. 
200 [d. 
001 [d. at 966. 
202 [d. 
203 [d. at 965. 
204 [d. at 966. 
206 [d. 
006 [d. 
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The Murtha court also disagreed with the municipalities' conten-
tion that the EPA's Interim Policy provides a legal basis for immu-
nity.207 The court reasoned that the policy is merely a guidance 
document that does not give protection to municipalities and does 
not limit the right of private parties to implead the municipalities. 208 
4. Beyond Murtha 
Other district courts have reached holdings similar to the holding 
of the Connecticut District Court: municipalities may be liable in 
contribution for the disposal of MSW.209 In Transportation Leasing 
Co. v. Calijornia,210 the District Court for the Central District of 
California rejected the municipal defendant's argument that CER-
CLA's definition of "hazardous substance" does not include rub-
bish.211 The Transportation Leasing court found it particularly per-
suasive that Congress had not provided an express exemption for 
MSW as Congress had done in excluding petroleum from CERCLA 
liability. 212 
In United States v. Kramer,213 a group of named PRPs argued, 
among other defenses, that the EPA's Interim Policy, in generally 
not naming municipalities, violated their right to equal protection. 214 
The Kramer court disagreed, however, and viewed the Interim Pol-
icy as rationally related to the purpose of replenishing the Superfund 
as efficiently as possible. 215 The Kramer court noted that CERCLA 
does not exempt municipalities and that private parties might still 
bring contribution actions against municipalities. 216 
In holding that MSW is not exempt from CERCLA's definition of 
hazardous substances and that municipalities may face CERCLA 
liability, both the Murtha and the Transportation Leasing courts 
found that whether the MSW of a particular municipality contains a 
CERCLA "hazardous substance" remained a question of fact. 217 The 
207Id. at 967. 
208 Id. 
209 See United States v. Kramer, 757 F. Supp. 397, 406, 409-28 (D. N.J. 1991); Transpor-
tation Leasing Co. v. California, 32 E.R.C. 1499, 1501 (C.D. Cal. 1990). 
210 Transportation Leasing, 32 E.R.C. at 1501. 
211 Id. 
212 Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (petroleum exclusion). 
213 Kramer, 757 F. Supp. at 397. 
214Id. at 432-33. 
216Id. at 43~35. 
216Id. at 434, 435. 
217 B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 754 F. Supp. 960, 967-74 (D. Conn. 1991), a/I'd, 958 F.2d 
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Transportation Leasing court ruled that the third-party plaintiffs 
must prove that MSW contains hazardous substances. 218 The courts 
did not declare what level of proof a named PRP would have to meet 
in order to hold a municipality liable in a contribution action. 219 From 
the Murtha opinion, it was unclear whether named PRPs could rely 
on general studies concerning MSW's composition or whether more 
rigorous site-specific information would be required to attach liability 
to those responsible for the disposal of MSW.220 The Interim Policy 
definitions noted that general studies do not constitute "site-specific" 
information sufficient to name a municipality as a PRP at a Super-
fund site unless the studies include information from particular PRP 
or Superfund site. 221 
After the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Murtha's hold-
ing that municipalities may be liable for MSW disposal under CER-
CLA, the Connecticut District Court considered whether generic 
studies concerning MSW led to the conclusion that MSW at a par-
ticular site is hazardous. The district court ruled that generic statis-
tical studies that the industrial PRPs submitted were not sufficient 
to subject municipalities and small business generators of MSW to 
third-party contribution suits. 222 In its decision, the Murtha court 
noted that disposal rather than generation, gives rise to liability. 223 
The court stated that studies must apply conclusively or that the 
PRPs must produce specific evidence for each third-party defen-
dant.224 The court added that although certain products that home-
owners discard may contain CERCLA hazardous constituents, the 
products are not "hazardous" under CERCLA.225 
1192 (2d Cir. 1992); Transportation Leasing Co. v. California, 32 E.R.C. 1499, 1501 (C.D. Cal. 
1990). 
218 Transportation Leasing, 32 E.R.C. at 1499, 1501. 
219 [d. 
220 See Murtha, 754 F. Supp. at 960, 968. 
221 54 Fed. Reg. 51,074, 51,075 (1989). General studies could be used to supplement site-
specific information. [d. 
222 Murtha, 754 F. Supp. (No. N-87--52 (PCD))(D.Conn. Jan. 12, 1993) (denying in part and 
granting in part a motion to add 1,151 potentially responsible parties to the suit.); see also 
Court Refuses to Allow Cleanup Coalition to Sue Homeowners, Businesses over Murtha Site, 
23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2577 (1993) [hereinafter Court Refuses]. 
223 See Court Refuses supra note 222, at 2577. 
224 See id. 
225 [d. 
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V. ADMINISTRATIVE ATTEMPTS To RESOLVE MSW LIABILITY 
A. "Fair Share" Plan Attempted 
As it became more clear that district courts were finding that 
municipalities may be liable under CERCLA, and as contribution 
actions against municipalities were increasing across the United 
States, the EPA began to look at establishing some form of admin-
istrative guidance beyond the Interim Policy to address the alloca-
tion of response costs at co-disposal sites.226 Who should pay and for 
how much at co-disposal sites proved, in the end, to be a difficult 
issue for the EPA. Industry argued that the presence of large vol-
umes of MSW that industry did not generate at co-disposal sites 
increases clean up costs. Municipalities argued that co-disposal sites 
would not be on the NPL but for the commingling of hazardous 
wastes and that cleanup without the presence of hazardous wastes 
would be much cheaper. 227 
In July 1991, the EPA announced a new municipal waste policy 
initiative.228 The Agency also planned a cost-allocation conference of 
municipal defendants, industrial PRPs, environmental groups, and 
congressional staff members in October 1991 to facilitate the devel-
opment of a model settlement document for municipalities. 229 At the 
announcement, EPA Administrator, William K. Reilly, noted that, 
"You should not be exposed to the expense and uncertainty of pro-
tracted litigation in cases where you are not the owner of the site 
and have sent only household garbage to that site. "230 The EPA 
Administrator also noted that, "I want to get people out of the 
Superfund system that the law did not intend to be major contrib-
utors to the cleanup. "231 Through a model settlement document, the 
EPA aimed to improve the process of resolving potential municipal 
226 Thomas R. Mounteer, How to Pay for Cleaning up Co-Disposal Sites: Enlarging the 
Scope of the Debate, 23 Env't Rep. (BN A) Vol 23, No. 23 (Oct. 2, 1992). 
227 Municipal Cleanup Cost-Allocation Policy Now Slated to Be Released by End of Feb-
ruary, 22 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2333 (1992) [hereinafter Municipal Cleanup]. 
228 New Policy Protects Municipalities, Exempts Homeowners From CERCLA Liability, 
22 Env't Rep. (BNA) 647 (July 19, 1991). 
229 Conference on Municipal Liability Planned; EPA to Develop Cost Allocation Guidelines, 
22 Env't Rep. (BNA) at 1368 (Sept. 27, 1991). [hereinafter Conference]. 
230 Cities, Congress Burst EPA "Trial Balloon" on Allocating Municipal Landfill Cleanup 
Costs, 22 Env't Rep. (BNA) at 2115 (Jan. 10, 1992). [hereinafter Cities, Congress]. 
231Id. 
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liability and enable municipalities to receive contribution protection 
from the suits of third-party PRPs.232 
In December of 1991, Don Clay, Assistant Administrator for Solid 
Waste & Emergency Response, floated a "trial balloon" concerning 
the allocation of costs at co-disposal sites. 233 Municipal groups argued 
that under the trial balloon's "double delta" formula, municipalities 
would bear a disproportionate share of a site's response costS.234 The 
double delta formula apportioned liability based on a volume ap-
proach. 235 
Less than a week after the announcement of the "double delta" 
approach, eight members of the House of Representatives sent a 
letter to EPA Administrator William K. Reilly opposing the plan. 236 
The Representatives believed, based in part on the relative shares 
of liability that might result under a double delta formula, that the 
double delta approach would continue to encourage corporate pol-
luters to subsidize the costs of their activities by suing local govern-
ments and their citizens.237 The negative reaction that the "double 
232 See Conference, supra note 229, at 1368. 
233 EPA Draft Slashes Municipal Superfund Costs to 4%, Enraging Industry, 13 INSIDE 
E.P.A. WKLY. REPORT, 1, 8 (Mar. 27, 1992) [hereinafter EPA Draft]. The Assistant Admin-
istrator floated the draft at a December 12th meeting of the National League of Cities. See 
Cities, Congress, supra note 230. 
234 EPA Draft, supra note 233, at 1, 8; see also Municipal Cleanup supra note 227, at 2333. 
235 Mounteer, supra note 226. The double delta cost formula is as follows. First calculate 
the costs of MSW and hazardous waste separately. (MSW volume x MSW unit remediation 
cost = MSW Cost) (hazardous waste volume x hazardous waste unit cost = hazardous waste 
cost). The total costs of MSW and hazardous waste are then compared in a ratio. Finally, the 
total response costs of a facility are allocated based on the ratio. For example, assuming 500 
tons of MSW and 100 tons of industrial hazardous wastes at cleanup costs of ten dollars per 
unit and 100 dollars per unit respectively. MSW cost: (500 tons x $lO/ton)= $5,000. Hazardous 
waste cost: (100 tons x $100/ton) = $10,000. MSW cost to hazardous waste cost ratio is 5,000 
to 10,000 or 1:2. The municipal share would equal 33 113 percent and the industrial share 
would equal 66 2/3 percent. At a site with total response costs of $100,000,000, municipalities 
would pay approximately 33.3 million while industrial polluters would pay 66.6 million. See 
Mounteer supra note 226. 
The EPA considered other approaches including the single delta, reverse delta, discount 
formulas, and piece-of-the remedy allocations. See Municipal Cleanup supra note 227. The 
piece-of-the remedy approach has been referred to as the "pie chart" or the type of remedy 
approach. See id. Under a single delta allocation, municipalities would bear the cost of remedies 
associated with the volume of MSW, such as the cost of a landfill cap, while the industrial 
PRPs would bear the remainder of the costs. See id. A reverse delta approach would calculate 
the costs of cleaning up the industrial waste as if MSW had not been co-disposed with industrial 
waste and then apportion the cost-difference to the municipalities. See id. A discount approach 
would employ a formula that takes into account the volume and toxicity of MSW. See id. A 
piece-of-the remedy approach would allocate costs based on what is driving individual com-
ponents of the remedy. Id. 
236Id. 
237Id. 
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delta" draft spawned caused the EPA to re-examine the proposal 
that EPA had hoped to release in January of 1992.238 
The EPA outlined a new version of the municipal strategy in a 
March 10th draft Federal Register notice.239 The revised draft uti-
lized a "unit cost" formula rather than the "double delta" approach 
as a method of apportioning liability at co-disposal sites.240 Under 
the "unit cost formula," the EPA would apportion liability based on 
a comparison of the average cost of cleanup at sites contaminated 
only with industrial wastes with the costs of cleanup at a site where 
only municipal wastes have been discarded.241 The "unit cost" draft 
noted that, under RCRA, the cost per-acre to close a municipal 
waste landfill is approximately $97,000, while the cost per acre to 
close an industrial waste landfill under CERCLA averages 
$2,279,000.242 The EPA has determined the general municipal waste 
share of response costs at co-disposal sites under the "unit cost" 
approach to be 4%.243 
Along with the draft's proposed "unit cost" approach, the draft 
pointed to an increased emphasis on flexible modes by which munic-
ipalities could pay their potential liability.244 For example, a munic-
ipality might provide in-kind services as a method of payment. 245 
B. "Fair Share" Plan Abandoned 
The EPA intended, but never did, release a final version of the 
"unit cost" draft to EPA regional offices.246 Clayton Yeutter, Presi-
dent George Bush's domestic policy advisor, intervened with EPA, 
apparently on industry's behalf, to inquire whether the Agency had 
considered all reasonable alternatives.247 White House intervention 
238 See Cities, Congress, supra note 230. 
239 See EPA Draft, supra note 233. 
240 Id. 
241Id. 
242Id. 
248 Id. EPA derives the municipal portion by U[d]ividing the municipal waste cost [per acre] 
by the sum of the municipal and industrial waste cost ... [per acre]." [97,000/(2,279,000 + 
97,000)] = 4%. Id. 
The unit cost approach would calculate costs under the following formula: 
(.04 x (total response costs) = total generator and transporter contribution share.) At a facility 
where total response costs equaled $100 million, the MSW share would be four million dollars. 
(.04 x (100,000,000) = 4,000,000.) See id. 
244 Id. 
246 Id. 
246 See Mounteer, supra note 226. 
247 See id.; see also Proposal on Municipal Liability Issue Draws Industry Fire, White 
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was apparently successful in causing EPA to hold back the release 
of the "unit cost" draft. 248 By November 1992, the EPA's attempt to 
release a final policy addressing municipal liability at co-disposal sites 
had been dropped.249 Until the Superfund reauthorization debate, 
the EPA plans to consider municipal liability at co-disposal sites on 
a case-by-case basis. 250 
The industrial PRPs favored the original double delta draft and 
the municipalities supported the unit cost approach. In attempting 
to address the complex apportionment issue that the courts were 
facing, the EPA encountered political resistance, and in the end, 
could satisfy neither the municipal nor the industrial interests. The 
focus of the debate shifted to the legislative forum. 
VI. LEGISLATIVE ATTEMPTS: THE TOXIC CLEANUP EQUITY AND 
ACCELERATION ACT OF 1993 
At the same time the EPA attempted to design an administrative 
solution to the MSW liability issue, legislation aimed to address the 
MSW problem was introduced in both houses of Congress as the 
Toxic Cleanup Equity and Acceleration Act of 1991.251 By mid-1992, 
while the EPA "re-examined" its interim draft, the United States 
Senate began to debate the merits of amending CERCLA to provide 
relief to those parties who may have disposed of MSW at Superfund 
sites.252 On July 1, the Senate passed a modified version of the 
TCEAA as an amendment to the Government Sponsored Enter-
prises Bill (GSE).253 The House of Representatives, however, did 
not act on the TCEAA. The following year, the legislation was 
reintroduced in both houses of Congress as the Toxic Cleanup Equity 
and Acceleration Act of 1993 (TCEAA).254 
The TCEAA of 1993 addresses how the EPA and private parties 
may deal with generators and transporters of MSW under CER-
House Intervention, 22 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2869 (Apr. 24, 1992). [hereinafter White House 
Intervention]. 
248 See id. 
249 Program Officials Hail Site Completions, Outline Accelerated Cleanup Pilot Projects, 
23 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 27, at 1714 (Nov. 6, 1992) [hereinafter Site Completions]. 
260 Id. 
251 H.R. 3026, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (introduced July 24, 1991); S. 1557, 102d Cong., 1st 
Sess. (introduced July 25, 1991). 
252 See 138 CONGo REC. 88627-8648, 8768-76 (June 23, 1992). 
268 138 CONGo REC. 9360 (1992) The aSE bill (S. 2733) is fonnally titled the Federal Housing 
Enterprise Regulation Refonn Act of 1992. TCEAA amended the aSE bill at section 1065. 
138 CONGo REC. 8836 (1992). 
254 139 CONGo REC. S1384, 1454-57 (Feb. 4, 1993). The Senate and House bills were intro-
duced as S. 343 and H.R. 870 respectively. Id. 
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CLA.255 For parties who have generated or transported MSW,256 
TCEAA would prohibit third-party contribution suits , 257facilitate 
settlement,258 and cap liability.259 TCEAA would apply retroac-
tively.260 Further, TCEAA precludes liability for MSW for munici-
palities merely acting in a regulatory capacity.261 At a later date, 
municipalities must establish a waste collection program262 and com-
ply with federal law concerning the handling of sewage sludge in 
order to take advantage of the bill's settlement provisions. 263 
A. Block on Third-Party Contribution Suits 
TCEAA would block contribution actions for MSW and sewage 
sludge by amending section 9613 of CERCLA.264 Under the modified 
section 9613, only the EPA would have the authority to recover 
response costs, penalties, or damages related to the generation or 
transportation of MSW.265 The amendments to CERCLA, do not, 
however, prevent private parties from bringing contribution suits 
when a municipality has contributed a hazardous waste that does 
not meet the TCEAA's definition of MSW.266 
The bill adds three definitions to CERCLA section 9601 including 
definitions of MSW, sewage sludge, and municipality.267 Similar to 
255 Toxic Cleanup Equity and Acceleration Act of 1993, S. 343, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ (a)-
(g) (1993). 
256 This Comment usually refers solely to MSW although the TCEAA also applies generally 
to sewage sludge. For the purposes of this comment, MSW shall refer to both MSW and 
sewage sludge unless referring only to sewage sludge. 
257 Toxic Cleanup Equity and Acceleration Act of 1993, S. 343, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. subsec. 
(c) (1993). 
256 [d. 
259 [d. 
260 [d. subsec. (h). 
261 [d. subsec. (b). 
262 [d. subsec. (c). Beginning thirty-six months after the TCEAA is enacted, for disposal of 
MSW that occurs at such time or later, municipalities must have established a "qualified 
household hazardous waste collection program" in order to utilize the TCEAA's settlement 
provisions. [d. The collection program must include: at least semiannual pql>licized collections 
at conveniently located collection points with an intended goal of participation by ten percent 
of community households; a public education program that identifies both hazardous products 
and safer substitutes; efforts to collect conditionally exempt generator; and a comprehensive 
plan, which may include regional compacts or joint ventures, that outline how the program 
will be accomplished. [d. For sewage sludge, owners and operators of a POTW must comply 
with section 405 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act to take advantage of the TCEAA's 
settlement provision. [d. See 33 U.S.C. § 1345 (1992). 
263 S. 343, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. subsec. (c) (1993). See Section 405 of the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act. 33 U.S.C. § 1345 (1992). 
264 S. 343, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. subsec. (b) (1993); see 42 U.S.C. § 9613. 
265 S. 343, 103d Cong., subsec. (b) 1st Sess. (1993). 
266 [d. 
267 [d. subsec. (a). 
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the Interim Policy, the bill defines MSW as household waste and 
includes, for example, food and yard waste, paper, consumer pack-
aging, and household hazardous268 waste.269 Waste derived from non-
municipal sources also may qualify as MSW when such waste is 
essentially the same type of waste that households generate or when 
the wastes meet RCRA's small quantity generator exceptions. 270 
Through an amendment to CERCLA's settlement provisions , 271 
TCEAA clarifies that its new provisions apply even if constituent 
components of MSW may qualify as CERCLA hazardous sub-
stances. 272 Neither combustion ash nor industrial process waste that 
is not "essentially the same" as household waste qualifies as MSW.273 
Under the TCEAA, "sewage sludge" refers to waste resulting 
from treating waste water at a publicly-owned treatment works. 274 
"Municipality" means any political subdivision including persons act-
ing in the official capacity of a municipality. 275 
In addition to the elimination of third-party suits against the gen-
erators and transporters of MSW, TCEAA creates a "public right-
of-way" provision that immunizes municipalities from liability when 
a municipality is acting in its regulatory capacity.276 Municipalities 
would not incur Superfund liability when hazardous substances are 
transported over a public right-of-way that the municipality owns; 
nor would a municipality incur liability when it grants a business 
license to a private party to transport or dispose of MSW.277 
B. New Settlement Procedures and Liability Cap 
By amending CERCLA's settlement provisions in section 9622,278 
the TCEAA provides a new mode of settlement for "eligible per-
268 Household hazardous waste includes painting, cleaning, gardening, and automotive 
wastes. [d. 
269 [d. 
270 [d.; see 42 U.S.C. § 6921(d). 
271 See 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)(I)(A)(i). 
272 S. 343 103d Cong., 1st Sess. subsec. (g) (1993). 
273 Combustion ash and industrial process waste do not qualify for the TCEAA's provisions 
although these substances, like MSW, may also be regulated under RCRA Subtitle D. cf. 
Environmental Defense Fund v. Wheelabrator Tech., 725 F. Supp. 758 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); see 
generally, State of Idaho v. Hanna Mine Co., 699 F. Supp. 827, 833 (D. Idaho 1987); aff'd, 
882 F.2d 392 (9th Cir. 1989); Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. United States EPA, 759 F.2d 922, 
927 (D.C. Cir. 1985); United States v. Carolawn Co., 21 E.R.C. 2124, 2125 (D. S.C. 1984); 
United States v. Metate Asbestos Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1143, 1146 (D. Ariz. 1984). 
274 S. 343, l03d Cong., 1st Sess. subsec. (a) (1993). 
276 [d. 
276 [d. 
277 [d. subsec. (b). 
278 42 U.S.C. § 9622. 
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sons," those parties who are subject to administrative or judicial 
action concerning the generation or transportation of MSW.279 The 
proposed legislation does not limit the liability of municipal and 
private parties in their capacities as owners and operators of a 
facility.280 Owners and operators, however, may take advantage of 
TCEAA's liability and settlement provisions to the extent their 
liability arises from the generation and transportation of MSW.281 
Parties who qualify as eligible persons may, through a written 
statement, make a "good faith" offer to settle their potential liability 
with the EPA.282 The statement must articulate the party's ability 
and willingness to settle its potential liability.283 The EPA's receipt 
of a generator or transporter's offer suspends,284 pending negotiation 
of a final settlement with the EPA, any additional administrative or 
judicial action against such generator or transporter. 285 
TCEAA establishes a time frame in which eligible persons may 
make an offer to settle MSW liability.286 A party may submit an offer 
within 180 days of receiving a PRP notice, within 180 days of becom-
ing subject to administrative or judicial action, or within 180 days 
of the EPA's issuing a record of decision concerning the response 
action at issue, whichever date is later. 287 
Once a party initiates TCEAA's new settlement method, the EPA 
must in good faith attempt to expedite a final settlement.288 TCEAA 
contains guidelines that must be followed when reaching a settlement 
with a generator or transporter of MSW.289 First, the aggregate 
level of response costs that the EPA attributes to the generation 
and transportation of MSW must not exceed four percent of the total 
response costs at a given facility.290 Moreover, the EPA must reduce 
279 S. 343, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. subsec. (c) (1993). 
280 ld. 
281ld. 
282 ld. 
283ld. 
284 The moratorium on administrative and judicial action applies unless the EPA determines 
that a generator's or transporter's offer or position during negotiations is not made in good 
faith, is not in accordance with the TCEAA's settlement provisions (subsection (c», or is not 
related to MSW generator or transporter liability. See id. 
285ld. 
286ld. 
287 Notwithstanding the time-frame in which a generator or transporter of MSW may tender 
an offer of settlement under the TCEAA, no party may initiate further administrative or 
judicial action against a person the EPA has notified until 120 days following such notification. 
ld. 
288ld. 
289ld. 
290 ld. As originally proposed in 1991, MSW liability would be apportioned under the TCEAA 
based on the quantity of hazardous constituents within municipal solid waste. One half of one 
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the aggregate level of response costs related to MSW to below four 
percent when the presence of MSW is not significant at a given 
facility. 291 
Once the EPA allocates the total level of response costs related 
to MSW, a settling party becomes liable for no more than its equi-
table share of the aggregate MSW liability.292 The EPA must limit 
an individual settling party's share of liability by taking into account 
the party's inability to pay, litigative risks, public interest consid-
erations, precedential value, and equitable factors.293 The EPA also 
must permit an eligible person to pay its share of response costs by 
providing in-kind services.294 Further, when a settlement is reached 
with the EPA, the EPA shall provide to municipal generators and 
transporters of MSW a covenant not to sue for liability resolved 
under the settlement. 295 
VII. RECOMMENDATION 
This Comment does not argue that MSW should be exempt from 
CERCLA liability, but rather, seeks to advance a workable scheme 
to apportion and settle a generator's or transporter's fair share of 
MSW liability. Current judicial and administrative approaches to 
addressing the MSW dilemma are inefficient and inappropriate in 
light of CERCLA's goals.296 Moreover, options available to the ju-
percent would be the presumed level of hazardous constituent. See H. R. 3026, 102d Congress, 
1st Sess. (introduced July 24, 1991); S. 1557, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (introduced July 25, 1991). 
Rather than the volume-toxicity approach that the 1991 version embodies, the 1993 version 
of the TCEAA simply allocates to generators and transporters of MSW a fiat four percent of 
total response costs that may be reduced taking into account certain factors. See S. 343, 103d 
Cong., 1st Sess. subsection (c) (1993). The 1991 version of the TCEAA also attempted to 
codify the Interim Municipal Settlement Policy. See H.R. 3026, 102d Congress, 1st Sess. 
(1991); S. 1557, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). Nor did the 1991 version of the TCEAA include 
a provision for requiring that municipalities participate in a waste collection program. See id. 
291 Toxic Cleanup Equity and Acceleration Act of 1993, S. 343, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. subsec. 
(c) (1993). 
292 [d. 
293 [d. 
294 [d. In-kind services would be valued at market rates. [d. Settlements should also, 
"beginning 36 months following the date of enactment, for disposal of sewage sludge occurring 
after that date, limit a publicly-owned treatment works' payments if it has promoted the 
beneficial re-use of sewage sludge through land application." See 139 CONGo REC. S1456, 1457 
(Feb. 4, 1993). 
295 [d. The TCEAA does not affect a person's ability to enter into a de minimis settlement 
with the EPA. [d. The proposed legislation does not need to provide for contribution protection 
from named PRPs because the legislation bars all contributions actions concerning the trans-
portation and generation of MSW. 
296 See supra notes 74-89, 219-52 and accompanying text. 
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diciary and options the EPA has considered do not go far enough to 
resolve the issue.297 One legislative proposal would address the weak-
nesses of the current judicial and administrative approaches.298 Con-
gress should amend CERCLA. 
A. MSW Liability is Inconsistent with CERCLA's Goals 
CERCLA, first and foremost, aims to clean up hazardous waste 
sites.299 CERCLA attempts to accomplish its cleanup goal by impos-
ing the costs of cleanup upon those responsible for the reckless 
disposal of hazardous waste, often those polluters who have profited 
while using inadequate disposal methods that have resulted in en-
vironmental harm.3°O CERCLA may not be a perfect environmental 
cost-accounting mechanism. Polluters pass on their costs of hazard-
ous waste cleanup to future purchasers of goods rather than to those 
consumers who already may have directly benefitted from hazardous 
waste disposal through lower prices. However, by imposing liability 
on industrial polluters, CERCLA imposes liability on those actors 
who are best able to spread the costs of cleanup. 301 
The disposal of hazardous waste should be treated differently than 
the disposal of MSW. This Comment does not dispute that, in some 
cases, industrial polluters' past actions, like the actions of those who 
have disposed of MSW, may have been legal. CERCLA, a strict 
liability statute,302 however, does not seek to cast blame; the statute 
seeks to assign responsibility.303 Likewise, CERCLA does not assign 
liability based on a threshold level of hazardousness in the substances 
297Id. 
298 Toxic Cleanup Equity and Acceleration Act, S. 343, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). 
299 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, Pub. 
L. No. 96--510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988»; 
see Silverman, supra note 5, at 835. 
300 See J.S. Lincoln v. Republic Ecology Corp., 765 F. Supp 633, 635 (C.D. Cal. 1991); 
United States v. Kramer, 757 F. Supp. 397 (D. N.J. 1991). 
301 See generally J.S. Lincoln, 765 F. Supp at 633, 635; Kramer, 757 F. Supp. at 397. 
302 See Tanglewood East Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568, 1572 (5th 
Cir. 1988); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044 (2d Cir. 1985); United States 
v. Hooker Chern. & Plastics Corp., 680 F. Supp. 546, 549 (W.D.N.Y. 1988); United States v. 
Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chern. Inc., 579 F. Supp. 823, 827 (W.D. Mo. 1984) aii'd 
in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 
U.S. 848 (1987). 
303 See Tanglewood East Homeowners, 849 F.2d at 1568, 1572; Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 
at 1032, 1044; Hooker Chem. & Plastics Corp., 680 F. Supp. at 546, 549; Northeastern 
Pharmaceutical and Chem. Inc., 579 F. Supp. at 823,827. 
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that are disposed.304 Trace amounts of hazardous substances will 
trigger liability.305 CERCLA liability, however, is inappropriate for 
the generation and transportation of MSW. 
1. MSW and Industrial Wastes are not Comparable 
CERCLA liability is inconsistent with the nature of municipal solid 
waste. The disposal of household garbage that may contain trace 
amounts of hazardous constituents may not be equated with the 
disposal of hundreds or thousands of gallons of toxic waste. 306 Recent 
studies indicate that purely hazardous sites are readily differentiable 
from co-disposal landfills in terms of chemical constituents. 307 More-
over, most co-disposal landfills would not be on the NPL if hazardous 
industrial waste also had not been disposed of at the same sites. 308 
2. Municipalities and Industrial Polluters are Inherently Different 
While imposing CERCLA liability upon any party that generates 
or transports MSW is inappropriate, imposing CERCLA liability 
upon municipalities is especially inconsistent with CERCLA's "pol-
luters pay" philosophy.309 There are inherent differences between 
industrial polluters and municipalities. Industrial polluters are mo-
tivated and constrained by profit. Municipalities serve unique and 
necessary public functions and have not profited from the disposal 
of MSW in the same sense as industrial polluters have profited. 310 
Municipalities are, however, constrained to provide important gov-
ernmental services with limited tax resources and sometimes legal 
limits on their ability to raise revenues. 311 
Imposing CERCLA liability upon parties who have disposed of 
MSW effectively subsidizes industrial cleanup.312 Such a subsidy may 
be equated to a random tax on those parties who have disposed of 
304 See, e.g., United States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp. 1298, 1309-10 (E.D. Mo. 1987); United 
States v. Conservation Chern. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162 (W.D. Mo. 1985); United States v. Wade, 
577 F. Supp. 1326, 1332-33 (E.D. Pa. 1983). 
305 See, e.g., Bliss, 667 F. Supp. at 1298, 1309-10; Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 
at 162; Wade, 577 F. Supp. at 1326, 1332-33. 
306 See generally, Crouch supra note 119, at 1; Gibbons, supra note 125, at 1; Review of 
Brown, supra note 119, at 17. 
S07 See generally, Gibbons, supra note 125, at l. 
308 See Steinzor & Lintner supra note 114. 
309 See Burke supra note 15, at 3. 
810 See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text. 
311 See Federal Hazardous Waste Policy supra note 22, at 373. 
312 See Steinzor & Lintner supra note 114. 
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generally innocuous MSW because, without the co-disposal of haz-
ardous wastes, municipal landfills would not be on the NPL.313 By 
shifting the costs of cleanup from the industrial polluter to the mu-
nicipality or other entities that have disposed of MSW, CERCLA's 
"polluter pays" philosophy is distorted.314 Municipal citizens already 
contribute directly to the cost of CERCLA cleanup through federal 
appropriations for Superfund. 
In addition, industrial polluters are more efficient at distributing 
the cost of hazardous waste disposal because they may pass the costs 
of disposal and cleanup on to the buyers of their products in the form 
of higher prices. 315 Raising taxes is a less, if not a completely, inef-
ficient mode of sending proper price signals to consumers.316 Raising 
taxes does not provide an incentive to producers of goods that may 
use or contain hazardous constituents to alter the composition of 
their goods. Rather than an industrial polluter bearing the full cost 
of hazardous waste disposal, consumers and non-consumers alike of 
products that contributed to hazardous waste pollution would bear 
the costs of hazardous waste cleanup through higher taxes. 317 The 
individual taxpayer may never know what portion of the tax bill that 
he or she receives in the mail represents the cost of cleaning up the 
industrial polluter's hazardous waste. Raising taxes hides the true 
cost of hazardous waste cleanup from both industrial polluters and 
consumers. As a result, municipalities and other generators and 
313 See 137 CONGo REC. S10952 (1992) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg). 
3141d. 
316 Theoretically, the production of some goods could be eliminated due to CERCLA liability. 
This Comment does not argue that environmental cost-accounting is always appropriate. 
Assuming CERCLA is perfectly efficient in imposing costs upon responsible parties, which it 
is not, those who do favor cost-benefit analysis should willingly accept the elimination of the 
production of goods whose costs outweigh their utility. 
316 One commentator has noted that Superfund liability ultimately is a matter of allocation. 
See Mounteer, supra note 226. In other words, citizens will pay, whether through municipal 
liability or higher prices of goods and services. The commentator further asserts that if 
municipalities do not pay a greater share than they would under the proposed TCEAA, 
industrial polluters will more zealously resist liability with other polluters, thereby increasing 
transaction costs. 
The possibility that citizens will ultimately pay anyway, and that industrial polluters will 
fight harder without municipalities in the PRP pool, does not justify subjecting generators 
and transporters of MSW to either litigation costs that may exceed potential liability or 
cleanup costs that may be twenty times what they would have been without the presence of 
industrial hazardous waste. Any allocation of liability should not ignore the deterrence function 
that CERCLA serves. Finally, one need only look back as far as Love Canal to understand 
that one of Congress' primary concerns in passing CERCLA was not making ordinary citizens 
pay for the disposal of MSW. 
317 Cf Mounteer, supra note 226. 
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transporters of MSW will continue to shoulder the costs of hazardous 
waste cleanup with little opportunity to influence consumer product 
purchases. More importantly, a municipality will not have the ability 
to influence an industrial polluter's input choices or disposal prac-
tices. 
B. Judicial Approaches and the Interim Municipal Settlement 
Policy are Inadequate 
N either municipalities nor industrial polluters know, where MSW 
contains hazardous substances, exactly how courts will apportion 
MSW liability.318 Courts have only noted that they may use their 
equitable powers as CERCLA authorizes.319 Industrial polluters as 
well as generators and transporters of MSW are unable to gauge 
accurately the potential apportionment of liability that might be 
imposed in a judicial decision. Consequently, neither party can make 
a fully informed settlement. 
The Interim Policy, as it stands, is ineffective. 320 Under the In-
terim Policy, generators and transporters of MSW generally do not 
participate in the settlement process with the EPA because gener-
ators and transporters usually do not receive PRP notices and be-
cause the EPA currently does not fully utilize available settlement 
tools.321 The Interim Policy gives no guidance as to how to apportion 
MSW liability and does nothing to discourage litigation.322 By allow-
ing named PRPs that have contributed hazardous waste to seek a 
portion of response costs from parties that have disposed of only 
MSW, the Interim Policy actually serves to increase litigation. Lit-
igating MSW liability causes municipalities to bear transaction costs 
that may be disproportionate to their actual share of liability. At the 
same time, municipalities have no guarantee that even if they do 
settle third-party suits, the EPA will not later seek response costs. 
In sum, the combination of current case law and the Interim Policy 
results in uncertainty, ambiguity, and inefficiency that serves to 
delay cleanup. 
318 See B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 754 F. Supp. 960, 967-74 (D. Conn. 1991), aff'd, 958 
F.2d 1192 (2d Cir. 1992); Transp. Leasing Co. v. California, 32 E.R.C. 1499, 1501 (C.D. Cal. 
1990). 
319 See Murtha, 958 F.2d at 1192. 
320 54 Fed. Reg. 51,071 (1989). 
321 See supra notes 155-67 and accompanying text. 
322 Id. 
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c. A Solution Framework 
An appropriate resolution to the MSW-CERCLA liability issue 
would consider the inherent differences between MSW and industrial 
waste and between municipalities and industrial polluters in light of 
CERCLA's goals. After factoring in the inherent differences be-
tween municipal wastes and industrial wastes and the differences 
between municipalities and industrial polluters, an appropriate so-
lution to the MSW-CERCLA liability issue would aim to reduce 
litigation and decrease transaction costs associated with apportioning 
MSW liability.323 At the same time, an effective resolution should 
promote predictability, consistency, and administrative efficiency. 
Ultimately, all of the qualities desired in ending the MSW-CERCLA 
liability debate should lead to the cleanup of existing hazardous 
waste sites and contribute to deterring the wanton disposal of haz-
ardous waste. 
The small percentage of hazardous constituents in MSW is enough 
to justify special rules of liability apportionment for any party who 
has generated or transported MSW.324 That imposing liability upon 
municipalities is generally inconsistent with CERCLA's philosophy 
leads to the conclusion that settlements with generators and trans-
porters of MSW should be addressed in a manner different from 
settlements with those parties who have disposed of industrial haz-
ardous wastes. Unfortunately, neither available judicial options nor 
proposals that the EPA has considered accomplish this goal. 
1. Judicial Apportionment Alone is Unworkable 
Considering the holdings of the district courts that municipalities 
may be liable325 for the disposal of MSW, and assuming that plaintiffs 
seeking contribution meet the burden of proving326 that MSW at a 
given site is hazardous, it remains unclear exactly how a court would 
apportion liability. From the outset, a judicial apportionment scheme 
appears unsatisfactory because it forces parties to litigate their lia-
bility and thereby increases transaction costs. Once parties resort 
323 See Mounteer, supra note 226. 
324 See Ferry, supra note 108, at 202. 
325 See United States v. Kramer, 757 F. Supp. 397 (D. N.J. 1991); B.F. Goodrich Co. v. 
Murtha, 754 F. Supp. 960, 967-74 (D. Conn. 1991), aff'd, 958 F.2d 1192 (2d Cir. 1992); 
Transportation Leasing Co. v. California, 32 E.R.C. 1499, 1501 (C.D. Cal. 1990). 
325 See Murtha, 754 F. Supp. 960 (No. N-87-52 (PC D)) (D. Conn. Jan. 12, 1993) (denying in 
part and granting in part a motion to add 1,151 potentially responsible parties to the suit); 
see also Court Refuses, supra note 222, at 2577. 
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to the courts for MSW apportionment, courts have tools with which 
to apportion liability.327 Courts might apportion liability based on 
anyone or combination of the following approaches: comparative 
fault, comparative causation, Gore Factors, or general considera-
tions of equity. 328 
Under a comparative fault approach to apportioning liability, a 
court might consider whether or to what extent a municipality or 
named PRP knew of the dangers of dumping their wastes and the 
magnitude of the risk they created in disposing of wastes. Perhaps 
one party or the other knew that its wastes were being co-mingled 
and that such activity would create a risk. 329 A court may further 
consider more subjective information such as the particular circum-
stances of a particular municipality or PRP. 
Under a comparative causation approach, a court could consider 
the volume and types of wastes sent to a facility. This would allow 
a court to consider the inherent differences, especially in terms of 
toxicity, between MSW and industrial wastes. Inadequate informa-
tion about sites and the commingling of wastes, however, make an 
approach that relies on waste volumes and characteristics to appor-
tion liability somewhat problematic. Moreover; it remains to be seen 
what type of volume/toxicity formula330 a court would employ. 
A third approach to apportioning MSW liability a court might 
consider is one that takes into account equitable factors.331 The Gore 
Factors effectively articulate a broad equitable approach. Under the 
Gore Factors, courts could weigh a municipality's ability to prove 
that MSW its distinguishable from other hazardous wastes, the 
amount of MSW a municipality disposed of, the toxicity of MSW, 
the municipality's involvement in the generation, transportation, 
treatment, storage, or disposal of MSW, the degree of care the 
municipality exercised in its activities related to the MSW, and the 
extent that a municipality cooperated with the EPA in preventing 
further harm. 
Other equitable factors a court could consider are the nature of 
each party's wastes and the party's connection to and degree of care 
in handling the wastes, how much a party profited from waste dis-
327 See supra notes 79-107 and accompanying text. 
328 Id. 
329 See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
330 Given the difficulty that the EPA had in its attempt to develop a uniform means ofMSW 
apportionment, it would seem that courts also would encounter difficulty in apportioning MSW 
liability. 
831 See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text. 
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posal, and how much each party can pay. The strength of an equitable 
approach is that it is flexible. 
Any judicial apportionment of MSW waste liability, where there 
are no administrative options to facilitate settlement with the EPA 
or private PRPs is unpalatable because it increases litigation and 
the associated transaction costs. Although under the different ap-
proaches to apportioning liability the courts may take into account 
the differences between MSW and industrial waste and the differ-
ences between those parties responsible for MSW and those respon-
sible for industrial waste, the lack of a set range of liability impedes 
and thereby discourages informed settlement. 
2. Administrative Proposals Only Solve Half of the Problem 
The EPA considered at least five approaches to supplementing the 
Interim Municipal Settlement Policy332 in which the EPA would 
encourage settlement with generators and transporters of MSW and 
provide contribution protection; double delta, unit cost, volume-tox-
icity formulas, type of remedy, and single delta.333 Each of the ap-
proaches represented a different method and view of the allocation 
of response costs at a co-disposal site. 
The double delta and volume-toxicity formulas suffer from the 
weakness of a comparative causation approach in that the formulas 
rely on volume levels to calculate costs. Actual site specific volumes 
of wastes are not generally available. 334 It is impossible to analyze 
each formula specifically because the EPA never officially released 
the plans through the federal register for comment. 
N otwithstanding EPA's decision not to pursue335 its fair share 
plan, the unit cost plan came close to resolving the MSW-CERCLA 
liability issue. The unit cost plan would have allocated to municipal-
ities four percent336 of the response costs at a co-disposal site. The 
EPA had based the cost-allocation ratio on a comparison of the costs 
of cleaning up MSW at a RCRA subtitle D facility to the costs of 
cleaning up hazardous waste at a CERCLA facility.337 The strengths 
of the proposed policy included its formula to predict liability and 
332 54 Fed. Reg. 51,071 (1989); see supra notes 221--51 and accompanying text. 
333 See supra notes 228-45 and accompanying text. 
334 See generally United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1253 (S.D. Ill. 
1984); United States v. Chern-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 811 (S.D. Ohio 1983). 
335 See Site Completions, supra note 249, at 1714. 
336 See EPA Draft, supra note 233, at 8. 
337Id. 
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the EPA's encouragement of settlement thereby allowing generators 
and transporters of MSW to reduce transaction costs by avoiding 
third party litigation. Generators and transporters of MSW might 
also reduce their cash liability by providing in-kind services.338 The 
weakness of the unit cost version of the fair share plan is that the 
plan does not block the third-party contribution suits prior to a 
municipality's settling with the EPA. 
Neither judicial nor administrative approaches to MSW liability 
represent an adequate solution. Judicial apportionment of MSW li-
ability subjects municipalities and industrial polluters alike to high 
transaction costs and may result in a subjective and unpredictable 
apportionment. Administrative apportionment of MSW liability may 
remove some of the subjectivity of judicial apportionment of MSW 
liability but leaves municipalities open to costly contribution actions. 
A proposed amendment to CERCLA responds to many of the weak-
nesses of the judicial and administrative approaches to apportioning 
MSW liability and serves to hasten, rather than delay cleanup. 
D. TCEAA Addresses the Weaknesses of Current Judicial and 
Administrative Approaches to CERCLA Municipal 
Solid Waste Liability 
TCEAA treats MSW as a non-hazardous substance and attempts 
to treat municipalities fairly within the CERCLA framework. The 
Act favors administrative settlement rather than judicial apportion-
ment of MSW liability and generally appears to supplement the 
Interim Municipal Settlement Policy. The legislation would: reduce 
litigation and the associated transaction costs of litigation; apportion 
liability equitably, predictably, and in a manner that is easy to use 
from an administrative standpoint; and promote early settlement. 
The Act would also encourage the recycling of municipal solid 
wastes. 339 
1. Consistency with CERCLA's Goals, the Nature of MSW, and 
the Municipal Entity 
By recognizing that there are inherent differences between MSW 
and industrial hazardous waste in defining municipal solid waste 
338 See EPA Draft, supra note 221, at 8. 
839 Toxic Cleanup Equity and Acceleration Act, S. 343, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. subsec. (c) 
(1993). 
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generally as household waste,340 TCEAA is consistent with CER-
CLA's goals. The Act specifically states that MSW does not qualify 
as a CERCLA hazardous substance even if MSW's constituents may 
contain hazardous substances. 341 The Act's MSW liability formula is 
based on a formula that follows the EPA's comparison of the costs 
of household waste and industrial hazardous waste.342 As a result, 
industrial PRPs may not force municipalities to pay hazardous waste 
remediation rates for generally innocuous MSW. By preventing mu-
nicipal citizens from further subsidizing CERCLA cleanups through 
higher municipal taxes, the TCEAA's liability formula is congruent 
with CERCLA's polluter pays philosophy. 
Because those parties that have generated or transported a waste 
"essentially the same"343 as MSW may also take advantage of the 
TCEAA's settlement provisions, the Act concentrates on addressing 
a particular type of waste rather than a particular party.344 The Act 
includes some provisions that might be particularly appropriate for 
municipalities. 345 For example, the EPA must limit a party's liability 
to its equitable share. 346 The EPA may consider the municipality's 
inability to pay clean-up costs in apportioning liability.347 A munici-
pality might provide in-kind services as a means of reducing its 
monetary liability.348 In addition, delayed payment would still be 
available under the Interim Policy. 349 
2. Reduced Litigation and Transaction Costs 
The block on third-party contribution actions is the heart of the 
TCEAA.350 The prohibition of third-party actions against MSW gen-
erators and transporters is an important change from the current 
administrative approach because municipalities may, under TCEAA, 
34°Id. subsec. (a). 
341 See id. subsec. (g); see also subsec. (d) (stating that the amount of hazardous substances 
in municipal solid waste refers to the quantity of hazardous substances that are constituents 
of MSW rather than to the overall volume of MSW). Id. subsec. (d). This section apparently 
is designed to give EPA statutory guidance as to how to prepare de minimis settlements 
dealing with MSW. 
342 See EPA Draft, supra note 233, at 8. 
343 S. 343, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. subsec. (a) (1993). 
344 See id. subsec. (c). 
345Id. 
346Id. 
347Id. 
348Id. 
349 See 54 Fed. Reg. 51,071 (1989). 
350 S. 343, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. subsec. (b) (1993). 
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avoid defending the contribution actions courts currently allow and 
the Interim Policy encourages. 351 
Under TCEAA, municipalities have the opportunity to avoid the 
judicial forum altogether. TCEAA would allow only the EPA to 
pursue municipalities for MSW liability.352 By blocking third-party 
contribution actions, TCEAA would reduce transaction costs that 
municipalities and industrial PRPs incur in litigating liability and 
the apportionment of MSW liability. 353 
3. Equitable and Efficient Apportionment 
While municipalities will not have to defend industrial-PRP con-
tribution actions, municipalities will still be liable for their fair share 
of liability.354 Under TCEAA's formula, municipalities pay a per-
centage of cleanup costs that is consistent with the comparatively 
disparate costs of cleaning up MSW and hazardous waste. The EPA 
will apportion four percent of the total response costs at co-disposal 
facility to the MSW generators and transporters. 355 
By capping MSW liability, TCEAA provides a formula that should 
be relatively simple to administer. The EPA .may simply multiply 
the total response costs by TCEAA's four percent figure to deter-
mine the aggregate MSW liability share. Moreover, the four percent 
cap is not an automatic rebate for industrial PRPs because the EPA 
may reduce the MSW liability share where appropriate.356 The lia-
bility cap would provide a guide to generators and transporters of 
MSW as to their liability and should thereby introduce some consis-
tency and predictability into MSW liability apportionment that would 
not necessarily exist in a subjective judicial apportionment of MSW 
liability. When negotiating with the EPA or other PRPs, named 
PRPs that have disposed of hazardous wastes also will have a better 
understanding of how much the MSW share will reduce total re-
sponse costs at a given facility. 
4. Swift Settlement Structure 
TCEAA serves to get municipalities in and out of the settlement 
process quickly and without the added burden of defending contri-
351 [d. 
352 [d. 
353 See generally Mounteer, supra note 226. 
354 S. 343, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. subsec. (c) (1993). 
355 [d. 
366 See id. 
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bution actions while negotiating with the EPA.357 Municipalities may 
initiate settlement with the EPA through a good faith offer within 
180 days of becoming subject to judicial or administrative action or 
within 180 days of the EPA's issuing a Record of Decision at a given 
facility.358 Moreover, because the EPA may not take further admin-
istrative or judicial action after a municipality makes an offer of 
settlement, municipalities can concentrate on working out a settle-
ment with the EPA for their potential liability without bearing ad-
ditional transaction costS.359 Presumably, the EPA could begin to 
apportion liability once the Agency has a reasonably accurate esti-
mate of a facility's total response costs with which to base the 
municipal share. 
Finally, the EPA may offer flexible or alternative methods of 
payment.360 Delayed payment in a lump sum or in installments might, 
for example, give a small municipality, or any municipality with 
financial difficulties or restrictions on raising taxes, some flexibility 
in meeting its liability share. In-kind contributions would also aid 
some municipalities that could assist in the cleanup but could not 
raise funds quickly.361 Significantly, the EPA also may provide cov-
enants not to sue to municipalities, thereby adding finality to a 
municipality's encounter with Superfund. 362 
In sum, TCEAA recognizes that equating MSW to chemical haz-
ardous wastes and thereby imposing liability on generators and 
transporters of MSW is inconsistent with CERCLA's goals. Through 
the use of TCEAA's settlement provisions, litigation and transaction 
costs will be reduced while liability will be apportioned equitably 
and predictably. A settlement under TCEAA will be quicker and 
thereby promote cleanup. TCEAA is a necessary modification to the 
present approaches to handling MSW liability under CERCLA. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
From Massachusetts to California, municipalities that disposed of 
MSW at landfills where industrial waste has been co-disposed have 
become the target of CERCLA contribution suits. The federal courts 
have held that, under CERCLA's present terms, municipalities may 
357 See id. subsec. (b), (c). 
368 See id. subsec. (c). 
359 [d. 
360 [d. 
861 [d. 
362 [d. 
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be liable for disposing of MSW to industrial polluters who bring 
contribution claims. Municipalities may either settle claims filed 
against them to avoid protracted litigation, the costs of which may 
exceed potential MSW liability, or submit to a subjective judicial 
apportionment of liability. Neither judicial nor administrative relief 
for municipalities is immediately in sight. 
An examination of the judicial, administrative, and legislative ap-
proaches to remedying the inadequacies of current case law and EPA 
policy concerning MSW-CERCLA liability indicates that CERCLA 
should be amended. The judicial interpretation that municipalities 
may be liable for MSW as a CERCLA hazardous substance, while 
arguably consistent with the terms of CERCLA, is incompatible 
with the nature of MSW in light of CERCLA's origin and its goals. 363 
Options available to the courts to determine and apportion liability 
for MSW appear to be unworkable. Administrative attempts to sup-
plement the Interim Policy moved closer to resolving the issue. 
EPA's attempts to produce a "fair share" plan, however, have not 
and will not materialize anytime soon. A recent court ruling364 and 
EPA's decision to drop its plan to supplement the Interim Municipal 
Settlement Policy pending the Superfund reauthorization debate in-
dicates that both the judiciary and the EPA anticipate that the issue 
of MSW-CERCLA liability will be decided in Congress. A legislative 
resolution to the MSW-CERCLA liability issue would remove the 
ambiguity and uncertainty that pervades the issue. 
The Toxic Cleanup Equity and Acceleration Act of 1993 directly·· 
answers most of the concerns of an appropriate resolution to the 
issue of MSW liability under CERCLA. By fairly and efficiently 
apportioning liability, and by encouraging swift settlement, the 
TCEAA promotes site cleanup. Congress should act this session to 
amend CERCLA by passing the Toxic Cleanup Equity and Accel-
eration Act of 1993. 
863 The possibility that the original victims of Love Canal might be responsible for some 
portion of cleanup costs under CERCLA had their municipalities disposed of MSW at the 
Hooker facility illustrates the absurdity of the possibility that municipalities should be liable 
for a large share of the cleanup costs at CERCLA co-disposal facilities. 
364 B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 754 F. Supp. 960 (D. Conn. 1991), a/I'd, 958 F.2d 1192 (2d 
Cir. 1992), (No. N-87-52 (PCD» (D.Conn. Jan. 12, 1993) (denying in part and granting in part 
a motion to add 1,151 potentially responsible parties to the suit). 
